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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. and E.U. have recently increased prosecution of international cartels; few developing 
countries have similar enforcement.  If these cartels have significant effects on developing 
economies, the lack of antitrust enforcement is a problem.  Geographically limited prosecutions 
may not provide sufficient disincentives to deter collusion that generates global rents.  
Prosecutions of international cartels by industrialized countries opens markets to developing 
country producers, but integration may be undermined if cartels create durable barriers to entry.  
Western governments are also susceptible to manipulation by cartel members asking for anti-
dumping duties.  Thus, developing countries may need their own antitrust enforcement.  A recent 
ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals creates the possibility that developing country 
consumers may be able to exact remedies in U.S. courts. 
Drawing on three detailed case studies and 42 recent prosecutions of international cartels, we 
discuss the effects on developing country producers, either as competitors or co-conspirators, and 
the effects on developing country consumers.  Using trade data, we quantify the order of 
magnitude of the effect on developing country consumers.  In 1997, the latest year for which we 
have trade data, developing countries imported $54.7 billion of goods from 19 industries with a 
price-fixing conspiracy during the 1990s.  These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 
1.2% of GDP in developing countries. (AEA-JEL classifications: L4, F1, O1) 
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Non-Technical Summary 
The U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development have all recently voiced concern about international price-fixing 
cartels.  The U.S. and European Union have increased prosecution of international cartels in the 
past decade, but very few developing countries have made similar enforcement efforts.  If these 
cartels have significant effects on developing country consumers and producers, the lack of 
antitrust prosecutions by developing countries against these cartels is an important problem.  
Geographically limited prosecutions may not provide sufficient disincentives to deter collusion 
that has worldwide benefits for colluding firms.  Ongoing prosecutions of international cartels by 
industrialized countries may open up markets for entry by developing country producers, but 
these efforts may be undermined if cartels create durable barriers to entry.  Western governments 
are also susceptible to manipulation by domestic producers using tariff barriers and anti-dumping 
duties to protect the home market, both during and after the price-fixing conspiracy.  Thus, 
developing countries may need to develop their own antitrust laws and enforcement capabilities 
to help deter international cartel activity.  A recent ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
also opens up the possibility that developing country consumers may be able to exact remedies in 
U.S. courts. 
In this paper we examine the possible effects of private international cartels on developing 
countries by looking in detail at three recent cartel cases, as well as at a broader cross-section of 
forty-two recently prosecuted international cartels.  We discuss the indirect effects on developing 
country producers, either as competitors or co-conspirators, as well the direct effects of cartels on 
developing country consumers.  By combining trade data with a sample of US and European 
prosecutions of international cartels in the 1990s, we are able to make a first attempt at 
quantifying the order of magnitude of the consequences of these cartels on developing countries 
as consumers.  In 1997, the latest year for which we have trade data, developing countries 
imported $54.7 billion of goods from a sub-sample of 19 industries that had seen a price-fixing 
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conspiracy during the 1990s.  These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 1.2% of GDP 
in developing countries.  
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I. Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Justice, the European Commission, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development have all recently voiced concern about, and in the former two 
cases, increased their prosecution of, international cartels.  These recent prosecutions of 
international cartels in a wide range of industries demonstrate that cartels have pernicious effects 
on consumers despite the obstacles created by legal prohibitions on collusion and individual 
firm’s incentives to compete rather than collude. 
As with private international cartels through history, most of the cartels recently caught in the 
antitrust net of the U.S. or EU competition authorities are made up of producers in industrialized, 
OECD countries.  Therefore, it is not surprising that most prior studies of the impact of these 
cartels focused on the better-documented effects on wealthy, industrialized countries.1  This 
appears to be true of both business and public policy players, as there has been little activity on 
the part of developing country governments or developing country consumers to respond to these 
cartels even after they have been shown to exist.  This contrasts with the actions of the Canadian 
government, which has consistently pursued anti-competition cases against firms who have been 
investigated first by either the U.S. Department of Justice or the European Commission.  One 
exception to this generalization is Mexico, which took action against the lysine cartel, and is 
investigating the vitamins cartel.2  The lack of action in response to these cartels also appears to 
hold true of private parties in developing countries, which have, with only a few exceptions, 
apparently not actively sought civil remedies against cartel participants to the extent that 
consumers in western, industrialized countries have.  There are a variety of reasons – legal, 
                                                 
1 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, see HARD CORE CARTELS, 6 (Paris, France 
2000).  See also speech by Mr. Mario Monti, Member of the European Commission in charge of Competition, 
Fighting Cartels: Why and How? Why should we be concerned with cartels and collusive behavior?, Address at the 
Third Nordic Competition Policy Conference (Stockholm, September 11, 2000) and the U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT (U.S. GPO Washington, DC 
2000).  
2 Brazil is also contemplating action against the lysine cartel.  See Scott Kilman, European Commission Sets ADM 
Fine, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2000, at A4. 
6 
political, and economic -- why this may be the case.  But, as this paper demonstrates, a lack of 
impact on developing countries is probably not one.   
This, in turn, suggests that a more comprehensive approach to promoting competition may be 
necessary.  Current regulatory institutions are neither international enough nor sufficiently 
focused on promoting competition rather than simply prohibiting particular anti-competitive 
techniques to assure that global markets will be competitive and open to new producers.  There is 
currently no competition authority that considers it within their purview to assure that developing 
country producers have access to markets uninhibited by restraints from private agreements by 
established producers. 
The extant research on the impact of cartels on developing countries focuses on commodity price 
stabilization schemes among developing country producers of primary products.  In these 
studies, the analysis focuses on developing countries as producers and industrialized countries as 
consumers.  In contrast, the cartels in our sample produce sophisticated manufactured goods or 
services; their members are largely international corporations based in industrialized countries.  
We examine two aspects of the impact of these cartels on developing countries.  First, we look at 
developing countries as producers, either competitors to or collaborators with, these international 
cartels.  In three case studies, we examine the creation of barriers to entry by cartels and their 
impact on developing country producers or potential producers.  We also examine the methods 
that may be used to induce cooperation with the cartel by developing country producers.  
Second, we take a cross-section sample of all international cartels prosecuted by the U.S. and EU 
in the 1990s and ask how price-fixing conspiracies may have affected developing country 
consumers.  This two-pronged approach gives a more complete picture of the varied direct and 
indirect effects of international cartels on developing countries.  
Section II begins with a brief overview of basic cartel theory and outlines the possible effects of 
international cartel activity on developing country producers and consumers.  Section III 
describes three recent cartels and their effects:  the citric acid, graphite electrodes, and seamless 
steel tubes cartels.  Section IV presents a cross-section sample of forty-two private international 
cartels from the 1990s and estimates the effect of these cartels on developing country trade.  
Section V discusses the legal issues posed by foreign plaintiffs seeking antitrust remedies in U.S. 
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courts for the anticompetitive conduct of international cartels.  Section VI presents conclusions 
and policy implications.   
 
II. Cartels and Their Effects 
A. Cartel Basics 
There are a wide variety of organizations that may reasonably be described as international 
cartels.  The focus of this paper is explicit price-fixing or market division agreements, known in 
policy circles as “hard core” cartels, among private producers from multiple countries.  These 
agreements are illegal in the U.S. and the European Union. They have been the focus of 
increased prosecution by U.S. and European Union competition policy authorities over the last 
decade.  (They are illegal in many other countries as well, although laws and enforcement vary.)  
There are other types of cartels, such as purely domestic cartels, private export cartels, and state-
run cartels.  Our analysis is limited to private hard-core international cartels.3 
Producers form a cartel with the goal of limiting competition.  By restricting output and 
increasing price, ideally to the price a monopolist would set (if the cartel controls the entire 
market), profits will be jointly maximized.  Assume for the moment that the firms in an industry 
have overcome the coordination problems necessary to establish a cartel.  Upon its creation a 
cartel immediately faces the problem of how to escape from the Prisoner’s Dilemma: by raising 
price above marginal cost, the cartel creates an incentive for each producer to cheat.4  Each firm 
has an incentive to shave its price, increase its output and market share, and thereby increase its 
profits.  But if each firm did so, collusion would immediately dissolve into competition.  
Repeated interaction (over time or across markets) can, by providing the incentive of future 
                                                 
3 Cartels with significant state involvement, such as OPEC, can certainly have important economic effects.  Their 
goals, however, are much more complex than private cartels, including not only the maximization of joint profits, 
but economic stability and international political influence as well.  The economic models that we use here, which 
presume a simple profit-maximizing objective function, are inadequate to address the functioning and impact of this 
set of international cartels.  Thus, we have chosen to exclude them from our analysis. 
4 The classic presentation of firms’ incentive to cheat on collusive agreements is George J. Stigler, A Theory of 
Oligopoly, 72 J. POLIT. ECON. 44 (1964).  For further discussion of cartel economics and a survey of empirical 
research on cartel stability, see Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 
University of Michigan Business School Working Paper, 02-001 (January 2002). 
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collusive profits, deter firms from cheating in the present and allow them to escape this 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.  This tradeoff can be expressed very generally as requiring that the 
discounted expected stream of profits from future collusion exceed the profits earned by cheating 
today: 
E[Πcheating today] + E[Σ  (Πfollowing an incident of cheating)δ] < E[Σ  (Πcolluding forever)δ] 
This means that the likelihood that an industry will bother to exert the effort to establish a cartel 
will depend on several very basic factors that determine the expected profits associated with 
colluding.  These include the benefits of colluding, the benefits of cheating, the extent of 
repeated interaction, and the discount rate. 
Consider first the benefits of colluding.  The incentive to create a cartel depends fundamentally 
on the cartel members’ assessment of the potential for an increase in price to lead to an increase 
in profits.  This depends, in turn, on such factors as the price elasticity of demand (as demand is 
more elastic, the potential for increasing profits decreases and the incentive to create a cartel 
decreases); the rate at which future profits are discounted (as cartel members become more 
impatient, collusion is harder to sustain); and variance in demand (at a minimum, demand 
fluctuations create coordination and complexity problems, as the optimal price changes 
whenever demand shifts). 
Next, consider the benefits of cheating.  If the benefits to cheating are sufficiently low relative to 
the gains from colluding, the industry will find that it lies within the bounds in which collusion is 
possible.  In order to successfully collude, it will also be necessary for cartel members to devise 
punishment mechanisms that provide necessary further deterrence to cheating.  That is, the 
second term on the left side of the inequality above (profits earned following an incident of 
cheating), must be very low or even negative.  The extent of multi-market contact -- the number 
of times and places that two firms interact – is one determinant of the number of opportunities to 
punish cheating; as it increases, so does likelihood that collusion will succeed.  Another 
important factor is industry structure on the buyer’s side of the market.  If consumption is 
concentrated in just a few customers, it is more likely that a cartel member would succeed in 
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increasing its market share substantially with a small cut in price and therefore be more tempted 
to cheat. 5 
The ability of the cartel to punish cheaters also affects the benefits of cheating.  Antitrust 
enforcement can make it difficult for a cartel to punish its members, particularly via a price war, 
as such punishment would make its existence more obvious to the antitrust enforcement 
authorities.  Antitrust enforcement also limits the use of fines as punishments; in permissive 
antitrust environments, cartels have frequently used mechanisms in which a firm that has sold 
over its quota or in some other way violated the agreement (e.g., sold below the agreed upon 
price or outside its assigned territory) simply compensates the other parties.  These mechanisms 
leave a trail of evidence, however, that must be avoided if there is a possibility of prosecution. 
Following Stigler (1964), as developed by Green and Porter (1984), economists have focused on 
the importance of the observability of cheating to collusive stability.  When cheating cannot be 
observed, it is harder to give firms an incentive not to cheat.  It is more likely that collusion will 
be disrupted either by cheating or by events that are empirically indistinguishable from cheating.  
For this reason, firms in the cartel may find it useful to invest in information collection in order 
to support the collusive equilibrium.6  In addition, cartel members often find that there is no 
substitute for frequent face-to-face meetings, in order to compare market information and discuss 
alleged occurrences of cheating.   
Finally, having established sufficient incentives for existing industry participants to collude, the 
ultimate critical element to sustainable cartel profitability is the existence of barriers to entry.  
                                                 
5 On the other hand, our sample of recent prosecutions of international cartels suggests that successful collusion is 
possible in industries with large customers.  The vitamins cartel, for example, lasted many years and sold to very 
large customers. 
6 David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin, The Sugar Industry Learns to Organize Information Exchange, in 
LEARNING BY DOING IN FIRMS, MARKETS AND COUNTRIES 103 (Naomi Lamoreaux et al. eds., 1999) and Margaret 
Levenstein, Do Price Wars Facilitate Collusion?  A Study of the Bromine Cartel Before World War I, 33 EXPLOR. 
ECON. HIST. 1107 (1996) examine the information collection procedures of two cartels in the sugar and bromine 
industries, respectively.  Industry associations often engage in the collection and dissemination of information, 
which may facilitate collusion.  The government may encourage this information dissemination, as the federal 
government did during the open price policies under the National Industrial Recovery Act, or as state governments 
did in the 19th century salt industry.  See Barbara Alexander, The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on 
Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs, 76 REV. ECON. STAT. 245 (1994) and Margaret Levenstein, Mass 
Production Conquers the Pool:  Firm Organization and the Nature of Competition in the Nineteenth Century, 55 J. 
ECON. HIST. 575 (1995). 
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When firms do manage to coordinate their conduct on incentive-compatible collusive strategies, 
they create an incentive for outsiders to enter the industry.  Coping with and preventing entry can 
undermine the best-laid collusive plans.  In some industries it may be that firms resist the 
temptation to collude because they know that it would only lead to entry (which might, given any 
cost of exit, make the incumbent firms worse off).   
The next section outlines the possible effects that an international cartel could have on either 
developing country consumers or producers.  The price effects are clear enough.  Therefore, we 
focus on the hidden entry barriers that may be created as a necessary part of the cartel. 
B. Potential Effects of Cartel Activity on Developing Countries 
For developing country consumers, or consumers in any country for that matter, the direct cost of 
a cartel is plain:  price will increase if the cartel is successful.  There may be other costs as well, 
such as decreased product choice (if the cartelized product is differentiated and geographic 
markets are allocated among producers) or a slower rate of technological change.   
For developing country producers, again as with producers worldwide, there are both potential 
costs and benefits.  Developing country producers may benefit from an industry price umbrella 
set by a U.S. or EU cartel, allowing non-cartel producers to sell at that price, or slightly below, 
without having to adhere to a cartel production quota.  There are, however, potential negative 
effects as well, and developing country producers may be particularly susceptible to these 
effects.  In order to ensure cartel survival, international cartels may engage in activity that blocks 
or slows entry by developing country producers.  For example, cartel members may use tariff 
barriers and antidumping duties to prevent entry by developing country participants.  
International cartels may also use government-authorized, non-tariff barriers to prevent entry 
(e.g., quotas or regulation) or punish outsiders (e.g., using trade reporting and import 
surveillance by government agencies to track where other firms are selling).  If these cartel-
imposed costs are significant, there will be a cost to the pace of economic development and the 
development process. 
In addition to those barriers intentionally or inadvertently provided by national governments, 
cartels can also use private barriers to prevent entry.  Historically, cartels have used a variety of 
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different techniques to block entry.  These include the threat of retaliatory or predatory price 
wars, use of a common sales or distribution agency (i.e., vertical foreclosure), and patent 
pooling.  For the most part, the public record on recent price-fixing cartels does not discuss 
whether the cartel engaged in activities to block entry because such evidence is not necessary for 
a criminal conviction, at least in the United States where price fixing is per se illegal.  In part, 
because of the secrecy surrounding cartel operations, we must rely largely on anecdotal evidence 
from which only tentative conclusions can be drawn.  However, we have found descriptions of 
activities by contemporary international cartels that may have been attempts to deter or block 
entry by developing country producers.   
One example is provided by the price-fixing conspiracy in the EU steel beam market between 
1988 and 1994.  Steel makers who were colluding to fix the price of steel beams “restrict[ed] the 
flow of information . . . in order to freeze out any new competitors," according to Karl Van 
Miert, the EU competition commissioner.7  It is not clear from the published record what type of 
information steel producers were trying to restrict in the steel beam case, but we do know that in 
many industries information about technology and more formally, patent pools, have been used 
by cartels in the past to create barriers to entry.8 
Or, consider the actions of graphite electrode producers from the U.S., EU, and Japan between 
1992 and 1997 (discussed more fully below).  The U.S. Department of Justice alleged that 
graphite electrode producers engaged in activity to disadvantage outsiders to their cartel, 
claiming that they “agreed to restrict non-conspirator companies’ access to certain graphite 
electrode manufacturing technology.”9  Again, while this charge appears in every individual 
indictment, indicating it was agreed upon by all cartel members, the details of the firms’ actions 
are not given. 
                                                 
7 Charles Goldsmith and Martin DuBois, European Commission Fines Steel Makers $116.7 Million, WALL ST. J. 
EUROPE, February 17, 1994, at 3.  
8 See, for example, Steven W. Usselman, Organizing a Market for Technological Innovation: Patent Pools and 
Patent Politics of American Railroads, 1860-1900, 19 BUS. AND ECON. HIST. 203 (1990), and Leonard S. Reich, 
Lighting the Path to Profit: GE’s Control of the Electric Light Industry, 1892-1941, 66 BUS. HIST. REV. 305 
(Summer 1992). 
9 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Japanese Subsidiary Charged with International Conspiracy to Fix Prices for Graphite 
Electrodes in the U.S., Press Release, February 23, 1998.   
12 
In another case, U.S. producers of ferrosilicon formed a cartel in 1989 and proceeded to use 
antidumping laws in the U.S. and Europe to bar entry to non-cartel members.10  However, the 
claim that firms were systematically filing anti-dumping claims and then withdrawing them 
following a, presumably threat-induced, agreement with importers has not stood up to rigorous 
empirical tests.11 
These kinds of activities may be particularly effective in limiting entry from developing country 
producers who are just entering international markets.  If effective, developing country producers 
may be excluded.  Even after cartels are broken up, the existence of these barriers may force 
developing country producers into joint ventures that limit their distribution or restrict it to 
certain markets.  Such joint ventures could then function as a way for colluding firms to 
accommodate developing country entry into a cartel under their own terms or to engage in an 
implicit cooperative pricing arrangement.  These arrangements give developing country 
producers access to the world market, but may do so at some cost to the degree of competition 
that would otherwise obtain in the industry.  In several recent international cartel cases, joint 
ventures have been established in the years following the forced break-up of the cartel.  This may 
reflect an attempt to consolidate and restructure the industry in a more direct way, in light of the 
break-up of the cartel. 
Of course, both developing country entrants and established producers could also have other, 
welfare-enhancing motives for establishing such joint ventures, such as sharing technology, local 
market expertise, or capital.  It is important to note that these explanations for joint ventures are 
not mutually exclusive; a joint venture might well accomplish both welfare-enhancing and 
competition-reducing goals of the participating firms.  Joint ventures (and mergers) in industries 
known to have a history of international price-fixing should be scrutinized by regulatory 
authorities and structured so as to support the welfare-enhancing gains from cooperation while 
                                                 
10 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L. J. 725 
(2000).   
11 Using data from 1990 to 1997, Taylor (2001) finds that most withdrawn anti-dumping cases either have no effect 
on market price and quantity, or are followed by a decrease in price and increase in quantity.  See Christopher T. 
Taylor, The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping Investigations:  Is There Evidence of Collusive 
Settlements, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Working paper 240 (August 2001). 
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allowing consumers in both developing and industrialized countries the benefits of enhanced 
competition. 
Given this overview of basic cartel operations and how cartel activity might affect developing 
countries, we now turn to three contemporary international cartel cases to find specific 
illustrations of these activities.  In each case, we provide a brief overview of the industry and 
then discuss the price-fixing conspiracy and its possible effects. 
III. Three Illustrative Cartel Cases 
As we will discuss in Section IV, there have been approximately forty international cartels 
indicted and prosecuted in the 1990s by the U.S. Department of Justice and the European 
Union’s European Commission.  Of this sample, we have selected three cases to show the 
potential effects of international cartels on developing countries:  citric acid, graphite electrodes, 
and seamless steel tubes.  In these cases the effects of the cartel were felt worldwide and the 
cartel exported a significant percentage of the product to developing countries.  Also, although 
the quality of the data varies, there is at least some price data obtainable in each case.  There are 
other contemporary cartel cases where the cartel, although international in its membership, 
covered only a limited geographic scope (e.g., Western Europe).  These cartels may have had 
significant effects for a period of time, but are not ideal for our focus on developing countries.  In 
addition, there are other recent cartels in the sample that probably did have worldwide effects, 
but were either services or customized products, so adequate price and trade data are not 
available (e.g., cable-stayed bridges).  In contrast, the three cases selected satisfy our criteria of 
having both broadly felt effects and publicly obtainable price data. 
A. Citric Acid Cartel 
1. Industry Background 
Citric acid is used primarily as a flavor enhancer and preservative, falling into a general category 
of chemicals called acidulants.  Acidulants are naturally occurring acids that inhibit the growth 
of bacteria and can offset product sweetness with their tart flavor.  In general, the main uses for 
citric acid are in soft drinks (its largest end use), processed food, detergents, and pharmaceuticals 
14 
and cosmetics.  The acidulant class also includes lactic, fumaric, malic and tartaric acids.  
Fumaric acid, for example, competes against citric acid as a preservative.  It is generally cheaper, 
but has certain chemical characteristics (e.g., a stronger acid taste than citric acid), that make it 
an inferior substitute for many processed foods.12  Citric acid is the most widely used acidulant, 
accounting for about two-thirds of the total acidulant market. 
Buyers can be large or small, but the large customers account for the bulk of citric acid sales.  
Given that the greater part of citric acid production goes to beverage companies, such as Coca 
Cola and Pepsi, the buyers are very large indeed.  Procter & Gamble is also one of the largest 
U.S. consumers of citric acid.  In fact, in the United States, approximately 70 percent of citric 
acid and sodium citrate sales go to 10 to 15 end users.13   
There are two primary production processes – shallow pan and deep tank fermentation.  The 
deep tank process is preferred in most industrialized countries due to lower labor requirements 
and better quality control.  This process does, however, require large amounts of energy as an 
input.14  Connor (1998) estimates the marginal cost of production at $0.60 per pound during the 
conspiracy period.15  The shallow pan process is more labor intensive and less capital intensive, 
and therefore operates on a smaller scale. 
Production is concentrated in the U.S., Europe, and China, although there are citric acid 
producers scattered throughout the world.  In the late 1990s Western Europe, the U.S., and China 
together had an 88% market share of world capacity, estimated at approximately 1.2 billion 
pounds in 1994.  Table 1 provides a summary of the key firms in the industry, their capacity, and 
market shares.  The U.S. industry in 1990, just prior to the start of the conspiracy, had three 
players:  ADM, Cargill, and Bayer AG (a German firm whose U.S. marketing was handled by 
Haarmann & Reimer, its U.S. subsidiary).  Cargill entered the industry in 1990, as the first 
                                                 
12 Fumaric Acid, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, July 24, 2000, at 33.  
13 Petition for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties: Citric Acid and Sodium Citrate from the People’s Republic of 
China, filed by Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer, & Feld, L.L.P. with the U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, filed December 15, 
1999, at 17.  (Public version of document obtained from ITC website:  http://dockets.usitc.gov.)  Hereinafter referred 
to as “ITC Petition.” 
14 ITC Petition at 15. 
15 John M. Connor, What Can We Learn From the ADM Global Price Conspiracies?, Dept. of Agricultural 
Economics, Purdue University, Staff Paper #98-14, August 1998, at 11.  Hereinafter referred to as “Connor (1998).” 
15 
producer vertically integrated forward from corn refining into citric acid production.  All 
producers are now vertically integrated.  In Europe in the early 1990s there were five producers 
in the citric acid market; the three largest were Bayer, Hoffmann-La Roche (a division of 
Switzerland's Roche Holding), and Jungbunzlauer International AG (Switzerland).  These 
European companies, as well as smaller Chinese importing companies, satisfied most of the U.S. 
import demand during the mid-1990s.  
Chinese producers have presented the most vigorous competition to U.S. and European 
manufacturers.  Up to one hundred small firms entered the industry in the mid-1990s with the 
help of the Chinese government.  Although the exact price differential has varied, in general 
Chinese citric acid sells in the U.S. for 10 to 20 cents less per pound than domestic supplies and 
European imports.  Some consumers consider China’s product to be lower quality and will not 
consider buying it, despite the price difference.  For others, particularly industrial users, price is 
the major decision variable.  Chinese exports peaked around 1994 and then dropped off as the 
Chinese government withdrew its subsidies and raw materials prices increased.  Exports from 
China rebounded after the cartel was broken apart, suggesting that the effect of cartel barriers to 
entry on limiting Chinese production was greater than the incentive effect of a price umbrella.  
The Chinese producers as a group currently hold about 15% of the U.S. market share.   
2. Price-Fixing Conspiracy and Its Effects 
According to U.S. Department of Justice documents, firms in this industry fixed prices from 
approximately July 1991 to June 1995.16  Although the citric acid cartel did not control world 
production, it did account for 75-85% of sales in North America and Western Europe.17  Citric 
acid firms have been convicted for these activities in the United States, Canada, and the 
European Union.  The fines are detailed in Table 2. 
                                                 
16 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department’s Ongoing Probe Into Food and Feed Additives Yields Second Largest 
Fine Ever, Press Release, January 29, 1997.  The reported cartel dates vary somewhat, depending on the particular 
firm charged and the antitrust authority or private plaintiff bringing the suit.  Connor (1998), for example, notes that 
DOJ indictments filed against the European participants in the conspiracy list July 1991 to December 1996 as the 
cartel dates.  See Connor (1998), at 11. 
17 Connor (1998), at 13. 
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There have been several follow-on suits by customers claiming damages.  One civil suit filed by 
bottlers and food processors was settled in 1996 for a total of $94 million (ADM, H&R, HLR, 
and Jungbunzlauer were defendants).  Cargill was named in this civil suit, but exonerated.  In the 
court opinion of September 1, 1999 the judge wrote:  “It is true that between 1990 and 1997 
ADM, H&R, and Cargill always changed list prices within a month of one another and generally 
did so in the same month…Although there appears to have been little competition in citric acid 
list prices, Cargill did price aggressively in actual contracts.”  This difference between list and 
transactions prices is important to keep in mind when we look later at the price trends in the 
industry in the past decade.  In particular, large customers generally pay less than list price. 
The members of the citric acid cartel fixed prices and allocated sales in the worldwide market, 
issued coordinated price announcements, and monitored one another’s prices and sales 
volumes.18  In addition, the cartel members recognized the importance of policing and enforcing 
the agreement.  They shared monthly sales figures and took stock at the end of the year of each 
company’s total sales.  A company selling more than its quota was required the next year to 
purchase citric acid from a cartel member that was under quota.19 
The structure put in place by the citric acid cartel members was quite elaborate.  The senior 
executives responsible for determining the broad outline of the cartel agreement were nicknamed 
“the masters.”  At first, when the cartel began in 1991, only the masters held meetings.  Later, in 
1993, “the sherpas” (lower-level executives) began to hold meetings as well in order to handle 
the day-to-day workings of the cartel and work out grievances between members.20   
The U.S. price trend from 1990 through 1999 is shown Figure 1.  Two price series from two 
different sources are plotted:  Chemical Marketing Reporter (CMR) and Purchasing Magazine 
(PM).21  One can see from the graph that the CMR data is more representative of a list price, 
while the PM data reflects, at least to some degree, true transactions prices.  Prior to the 
                                                 
18 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department’s Ongoing Probe Into Food and Feed Additives Yields Second Largest 
Fine Ever, Press Release, January 29, 1997. 
19 Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Wins A Round Against Cartel, NEW YORK TIMES, January 30, 1997, at 1. 
20 European Commission document DN: IP/01/1743. (05/12/2001) 
21 Most of these data (1987-97) are taken from Connor (1998) Appendix Table 1, which presents price data 
compiled from various issues of CMR and PM.  We have updated the data series from the same two sources through 
1999.   
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conspiracy, during the time when the industry was adjusting to Cargill’s entry and Pfizer’s exit, 
there was a price war.  Prices in early 1991 were driven down to the high-50 cent range.22  The 
price war ended in early 1991.  List prices rose steadily after that, stabilizing at 85 cents per 
pound in the U.S. between 1993 and 1996 (this is reflected in the CMR line).  According to 
Connor (1998), actual transactions prices, as reflected by the PM line in Figure 1, stayed from 1 
cent to 5 cents lower than list prices.  For example, in 1991 CMR reported that “despite the 68-
cent list price, agreements are currently settled at about 63 cents.”23 
Although the transaction price increase is slightly less dramatic, both price series in Figure 1 
show a steady increase in price and then a decline after the conspiracy ended.  EU Competition 
Commission Mario Monti reported that citric acid prices rose by 50 percent during the 
conspiracy.24  One has to be careful, of course, about drawing strong conclusions from such 
statements or from the price charts included in this paper, since they do not control for other 
factors affecting price.  For example, there are seasonal effects in pricing due to increased 
demand from the beverage market in late spring and early summer.   
More generally, charges of increased cartel prices must be interpreted with care because some 
portion of the increase may reflect other factors such as rising raw materials costs or increases in 
demand.  The price charts are purely descriptive, and do not purport to control for other relevant 
factors that may have affected prices during the conspiracy period.  In addition, we do not 
estimate what the price would have been in the “but-for” world.  That is, although it is clear that 
there was a conspiracy and that firms have admitted their guilt, we have not attempted to 
estimate the competitive price or the price that would have prevailed absent the cartel.  Any 
conclusions, therefore, about the effects of cartel activity must be drawn with great care.25 
In order to provide an estimate of the order of magnitude of the effect of this cartel on 
developing country consumers, we start with Connor’s (1998) estimate that buyers in the U.S. 
                                                 
22 Melissa Shon, Cargill, Jungbunzlauer Slate Citric Acid Additions, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, March 30, 
1992, at 7. 
23 David Axinn, Citric Acid Marks Rise as Market Settles Down, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, July 22, 1991, 
at 18. 
24 Competition: Monti Calls for Higher Fines on Cartels, EUROPEAN REPORT (September 13, 2000).  Unfortunately, 
Monti does not specify whether he is referring to US or European price increases (or whether they were the same.   
25 We are not able to estimate but-for prices due to lack of publicly available cost and transaction price data. 
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paid an extra 21-24% during the conspiracy, using marginal cost as the “but-for” or 
counterfactual price.26  If we simply round down and assume that prices increased 20% on an 
approximately 300,000 million pound per year market in the “Rest of the World” (i.e., markets 
outside the United States, Canada, and Europe), so that the prices charged were ten cents per 
pound above the competitive level (which is substantially less than the observed price increase), 
this would amount to a cost of $30 million per year to consumers.   The cost to these consumers 
is also the benefit to cartel members.  The monopoly profits earned in these markets provide an 
incentive for firms to collude; no corresponding punishment or fine has lessened this incentive. 
It is possible that developing country producers may have received an increased price during the 
conspiracy period by riding on the coattails of the major producers.  Conversely, developing 
country producers may have been damaged if the cartel was able to somehow prevent imports 
into its territory.  The existing literature has reached no consensus on the net impact of these 
effects on cartel outsiders.  We do have some evidence of attempts to limit entry from citric acid 
anti-dumping cases that were filed during the conspiracy period.  India imposed anti-dumping 
duties on citric acid imports from China in November 1998.  Before the duties were imposed, 
China had captured close to 40% of the Indian market for citric acid.  If China was being 
excluded from the U.S. and European markets, either through anti-dumping cases or private 
restraints, they may have turned to India as an outlet for their product.  Thus, this may not relate 
directly to the cartel, but could be an indirect consequence.  It is even possible that the multi-
national firms that participated in the cartel were able to influence Indian policy toward Chinese 
imports.27 
                                                 
26 Connor (1998), at 10.  Lawrence J. White, Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?, 18 REV. IND. 
ORGAN. 23 (2001).  Lawrence J. White disputes Connor’s use of marginal cost as the “but-for” price for the lysine 
conspiracy.  White argues that the true “but-for” price was higher, based on the fact that the market was a four-firm 
oligopoly that probably would not have converged at an equilibrium price at marginal cost.  White also argues for a 
shorter cartel period than Connor.  Of course, from a policy perspective, the relevant question is what is necessary to 
achieve a competitive price that assures an efficient allocation of producers' resources and individual consumption 
decisions.  Thus, for our purposes, the marginal cost price is the relevant comparison. 
27 There are other examples of attempts by international cartels to use anti-dumping laws to sustain collusion.  The 
ferrosilicon price-fixing conspiracy lasted from 1989-1991 and involved producers from the U.S. and Norway.  Five 
of the six major US manufacturers pleaded guilty and were fined.  These same firms asked for, and received, anti-
dumping duties that were placed on Brazil, China, and other countries.  When the International Trade Commission 
found out about the U.S. firms' involvement in a cartel, it reversed the tariffs.   
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U.S. producers have twice tried to use the government to help protect the domestic industry from 
Chinese imports.  First, in 1995, while the cartel was still intact, producers lobbied the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative to include citric acid on the list of various Chinese imports to be 
hit with a high tariff.  A last-minute agreement prevented the sanctions from being imposed.28  
The second anti-dumping allegation was brought at the end of 1999 by ADM, Cargill, and Tate 
& Lyle, who reacted to the rise in imports of citric acid from China by filing a petition with the 
Department of Commerce and the International Trade Commission seeking anti-dumping duties 
of 350% on Chinese imports.  While U.S. prices in early 2000 averaged around 63-66 cents per 
pound, citric acid from China was selling for about 53 cents per pound.29  According to claims 
made in the case, the filing was prompted in part because two of the largest consumers of citric 
acid, Proctor & Gamble and Ashland Chemical Inc. (a distributor) switched to Chinese citric acid 
for their raw material needs.  Contradictory testimony was given regarding whether the quality of 
citric acid from China met U.S. standards.  One Chinese supplier tried to qualify to supply 
Quaker Oats, for example, and was turned down (although this same supplier does sell to smaller 
U.S. food manufacturers).  The ITC dismissed the case in February of 2000, after deciding that 
there was no material injury.30  At the hearings, it certainly weighed against the producers that 
these same producers had just been convicted and fined for cartel behavior.  U.S. and European 
governments must be extremely wary of such attempts by firms to use the state as a tool for 
creating barriers to entry. 
There has been rapid consolidation in the industry since the price-fixing conspiracy was 
revealed.  Internationally, Hoffmann-La Roche completed its sixth joint-venture facility in China 
in 1997.  Its partner, Wuxi Zhongya, is one of China’s three largest producers.31  Cargill and Tate 
& Lyle are both investing in Brazil, where a high quality and low cost sugar supply is attracting 
citric acid manufacturers.32  There are two ways to interpret these events.  One is that, following 
the demise of the cartel, western producers are accepting entry from developing country 
                                                 
28 Cheryl Cullinan Lewis, Citric Acid, PURCHASING, May 4, 1995. 
29 Feliza Mirasol, DOC Investigates Possible Dumping of Citric Acid, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, January 
17, 2000, at 4. 
30 Clay Boswell, Pucker Up: A Taste for Tartness Drives Acidulants, CHEMICAL MARKETING REPORTER, May 29, 
2000, at 16. 
31 Kevin Gopal, Keeping the Faith, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE, January 1, 1998, at 36.  
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producers.  The alternative is that former cartel members are attempting to re-establish market 
dominance, absent the cartel, through these joint ventures. 
Prices have fallen, both in the U.S. and in Europe since the demise of the cartel.  Figure 1 shows 
the general downward trend in U.S. prices since late 1995.  CMR and PM both report that prices 
are down and stable, despite the fact that demand is strong.  European prices, which tend to be 
lower than U.S. prices, have followed a similar pattern:  the average price per kilogram ranged 
from $1.68 - $1.82 in 1995, $1.04 - $1.39 in 1997, and $1.06 - $1.17 in 1999 (still well above 
Connor’s estimate of marginal cost).33   
B. Graphite Electrodes Cartel 
1. Industry Background 
Graphite electrodes (GE) are large carbon columns used by electric arc furnaces (EAF) or “mini-
mills” in the making of steel.  These mini-mills use graphite electrodes to generate the enormous 
heat necessary to melt scrap metal and convert it back into a marketable steel product.  GEs are 
made from synthetic graphite, for which the primary raw materials are petroleum coke, coal tar 
and petroleum pitch.  The petroleum coke is crushed and mixed with the pitch into a paste, which 
is then extruded through a press.  The electrodes are baked and undergo a series of refinements.  
The electrodes are then machined to meet the customer’s specifications. 
GEs are the only material that can generate sufficient heat to melt scrap steel.  There is no 
competitive substitute, other than the more traditional methods of making steel (i.e., open hearth 
and basic oxygen).  GEs make up about 6-7 percent of the cost of converting scrap to steel.  
Almost fifty percent of GE costs are raw materials costs, the bulk of which is petroleum coke 
(also called needle coke for electrodes applications).  Labor costs represent about twenty percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
32 Kiernan Gartlan, Tate & Lyle To Expand Brazilian Citric Acid Operations, DOW JONES COMMODITIES SERVICES, 
October 19, 2000. 
33 Citric Acid, EUROPEAN CHEMICAL NEWS, March 6-12, 2000. 
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of total costs.34  The production process is highly electricity intensive, and therefore the 
electricity portion of the cost varies by location within a country and across countries.   
A new plant takes 3-4 years to build.  A civil complaint filed by numerous steel producers 
against the GE manufacturers highlights the significant barriers to entry that exist even without a 
cartel: “The production of GEs is a mature, capital-intensive business that requires detailed 
product and process know-how.  It takes approximately four years to build a new plant with a 
20,000-ton capacity.  No significant new player has entered the industry since 1950.”35  Thus 
entry is limited not only by high capital requirements but also by the importance of implicit 
technical and market knowledge. 
There was a shakeout and consolidation in the industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just 
prior to the price-fixing conspiracy.  The consolidation was precipitated by slumping steel 
production.  In fact, GE industry capacity has shrunk by one-third since the mid-1980s.36  The 
number of producers has since stabilized.  Table 3 provides a summary of the major firms in the 
industry and their market shares.  In this highly concentrated market, UCAR International of the 
United States and SGL Carbon Corporation of Germany dominate, with a combined world 
market share of roughly two-thirds.  Both firms manufacture electrodes in many countries 
(including such developing and transition economies as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Russia, 
and Poland) and sell throughout the world.  There are also a number of other firms who are not 
global producers, but who do sell their product globally.  The C/G Group, for example, has 
plants only in the United States, but sells throughout the world.  Supporting this world market are 
fairly low transportation costs, generally less than 5% of the cost of the electrodes.37 
                                                 
34 Barbara Martinez, Robert Krauss Chairman CEO and President of UCAR International, DOW JONES INVESTOR 
NETWORK, October 6, 1995. 
35 Ferromin International Trade Corp., et al. v. UCAR, et al.  In the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, Second amended complaint, filed May 1, 1999, at paragraph 47.  Hereinafter referred to as 
the “Ferromin complaint.” 
36 New Issues – UCAR International IPO, STANDARD & POORS EMERGING AND SPECIAL SITUATION NEWSLETTER, 
November 14, 1994, at 15.  
37 Ferromin complaint, paragraph 50. 
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The share of EAF production as a percentage of total world steel production has grown rapidly 
over the past two decades.  Mini-mills now comprise about one-third of total steel production.  
Table 4 shows how EAF production was distributed around the globe in 2000:38 
2. Price-Fixing Conspiracy and Its Effects 
Price-fixing by graphite electrode producers began in 1992 and continued through at least 
1997.39  According to reports in the press, investigation of alleged price-fixing began after a 
complaint from a steel manufacturer.40  Lawsuits and criminal charges have been brought in the 
U.S., Canada, and the European Union.41  Convictions are detailed in Table 2.  In the U.S., for 
example, there were seven firms indicted for price-fixing, UCAR, SGL, C/G, Showa Denko, 
Tokai, SEC, and Nippon, and six firms fined (C/G was granted leniency by the Department of 
Justice).  An eighth firm, VAW Aluminum, was fined by the European Commission, but not by 
either the U.S. or Canada.  Fines (not including civil damages) against these eight firms now 
total almost $500 million. 
After the GE firms pled guilty to the U.S. charges, dozens of civil suits followed.  Almost forty 
U.S. steel producers sued for damages, and many of these suits have been settled.  In general, 
although manufacturers in developing countries must have been damaged by many recent 
worldwide cartels, such as the vitamin, citric acid, lysine, and steel tube conspiracies, they have 
apparently not sued in U.S. courts.  The graphite electrodes case is an exception, where a civil 
lawsuit has been brought by a group of non-U.S. steel producers.  27 international EAF steel 
producers, many of them from developing countries, filed the “Ferromin” antitrust suit in 
February 1999.42  The plaintiffs’ firms reside in Turkey, Thailand, China, Australia, and Sweden.  
The defendants named are UCAR, SGL, Tokai, C/G, Nippon and SEC.  The plaintiffs claim that 
                                                 
38 International Iron and Steel Institute, Trends and Indicators: World Steel Production Data, at 
http://www.worldsteel.org/trends_prod/prod06. (visited November 2000). 
39 EUROPEAN UNION, Commission Fines Eight Companies in Graphite Electrode Cartel, European Union Press 
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graphite electrodes on behalf of its Turkish affiliates. 
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their purchases of GEs in the U.S., Europe, Australia and Asia totaled $180 million over 1992-97 
and that they were overcharged an average of 45 percent during this period.  In June 2001 a U.S. 
District Court dismissed most of these claims giving standing only to those plaintiffs who state 
they can show that the GEs they purchased were invoiced in the United States.43  We will discuss 
the legal issues arising from this case and a similar Christie’s art auction case in more detail in 
Section V.  
The information that we have on the cartel structure and organization comes almost exclusively 
from the U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation.  Cartel members agreed to: 1) increase and 
maintain prices, 2) eliminate price discounts,44 3) allocate volume among conspirators, 4) divide 
the world market among themselves and designate the price leader in each region, 5) reduce or 
eliminate exports to members’ home markets, 6) restrict capacity, 7) restrict non-conspirator 
companies’ access to certain graphite electrode manufacturing technology, 8) exchange sales and 
customer information in order to monitor and enforce the cartel agreement, and 9) issue price 
announcements and price quotations in accordance with the agreement.   
Each of the provisions listed above would be considered “normal” (necessary, but not sufficient) 
for the successful operation of a cartel.  One of the most interesting aspects of the conspiracy is 
the agreement to restrict access to technology, although the Justice Department has, so far, 
provided no details of these allegations.  One of the most noteworthy absences, though, is a 
provision of penalties for cheating on the agreement.  This may have been implicit and discussed 
in the meetings, but never formalized.  Since they did collect and share information on sales for 
the purposes of enforcing the agreement, there presumably would have been a discussion (or 
implicit threats) of the consequences of cheating. 
The alleged price increases by the cartel were significant.  In the United States, graphite 
electrode prices increased over 50% from May 1992 through February 1997.  The Ferromin 
antitrust claimants allege that the price increases they suffered averaged over 45%.  In Canada 
                                                 
43 Ferromin complaint. 
44 More specific information on this point is given in Government's Sentencing Memorandum and Government's 
Motion for a Guidelines Downward Departure (U.S.S.G. §5K1.1), U.S. Department of Justice, Filed October 19, 
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prices rose by more than 90% over 1992-97.45  The Canadian market was much more 
concentrated at the time, consisting only of UCAR and SGL, with a combined market share 
during the conspiracy years of over 90 percent.   
The U.S. price trend from 1980 through 2000 is shown Figure 2.  The chart captures the fall in 
prices during the steel slump of the late 1980s, a clear increasing trend in the nominal price of 
GEs during the cartel period, and a decline after the firms were convicted by the DOJ.  (The 
dotted line indicates missing data for the mid-1980s.)  Purchasing Magazine reports that the last 
price trough was $2,100 per metric ton in early 1992.46  In May 1992 the U.S. price was $3,123, 
and by February 1997 it had risen to $3,439.47 
Developing country producers may have been able to increase their prices under the rising cartel 
price umbrella.  That does not mean that developing country producers would have charged the 
same cartel price; there may be quality differences or other differences in transportation costs, 
supply assurance, contract terms, and so on.  Although this is a reasonable conjecture, given 
profit-maximizing behavior on the part of developing country producers, we have no data to 
corroborate this hypothesis. 
Alternatively, developing country GE producers may have been damaged if the cartel was able to 
prevent imports into its territory.  Indian graphite electrode producers have made exactly this 
accusation:  “Producers claim that the electrodes are being dumped into India at a price of $2200 
per tonne as against the international price of $3200 per tonne."48  In response to a complaint 
filed by the Indian Graphite Electrode Manufacturers Association, the government imposed anti-
                                                 
45 Industry Canada, Competition Bureau, Foreign Corporation Fined $12.5 Million for Price Fixing, News Release 
(July 18, 2000).   
46 Hotline, PURCHASING, October 19, 1995.  Viewed on the web at 
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48 CVD on Graphite Electrodes Imports Likely, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, April 20, 1997, at 2. 
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dumping duties in 1997 on imports from the U.S., several European countries, and China.49  
Since the anti-dumping claims were filed in 1996, while the conspiracy was still operating, it is 
possible that the conspiring GE producers were trying to force the exit of, or at least discipline, 
Indian producers. 
There has been a clear downward price trend since the conspiracy ended, as shown in Figure 2.  
This certainly reflects in part the Asian financial crisis that hit the steel industry and therefore the 
graphite electrode industry in late 1998.  There is some evidence, albeit anecdotal, that points to 
readjustment to a new equilibrium in the industry since the cartel ended.  One recent article 
mentions a “market share-driven price war” that has cut prices by five percent.50  In addition, 
individual companies have restructured in the face of mounting fines.  Joint ventures are also 
being formed.  In 1999, for example, UCAR entered into a production and marketing joint 
venture with Jilin Carbon, the largest Chinese producer of graphite electrodes.51  Whether such a 
joint venture facilitates or controls Chinese entry is not yet clear, but it does suggest that 
monitoring of industries by competition authorities after the breakup of a price-fixing conspiracy 
may be warranted. 
C. Seamless Steel Tubes (Oil Country Tubular Goods) Cartel 
1. Industry Background  
Seamless steel tubes, pipes, and casings are used in the construction of wells in the oil and gas 
industry.  They are often referred to in the trade literature as Oil Country Tubular Goods 
(OCTG). Steel line pipes are used in the transmission of oil and gas from wells.  Stainless steel 
tubes, made by established steel producers, represent new competition for the traditional OCTG 
product, and are the only substitute.   
Demand is extremely variable over time.  It is closely correlated with the amount of drilling 
currently being undertaken by oil and gas firms, which in turn depends on the price of oil and 
gas.  This means that there is excess capacity in the steel tubes industry during periods of low oil 
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prices.  During periods of increasing oil prices, oil producers seem to accept price increases in 
OCTG, but OCTG prices also seem to come quickly down when the price of oil does, as steel 
producers try to make use of existing fixed capacity. 
Natural gas creates greater demand for OCTG than does oil drilling, because natural gas wells 
are deeper.  Thus, consumer substitution of natural gas for oil increases demand for OCTG (and 
the reverse).  OCTG costs are not a large enough portion of the cost of production to lead to a 
shift between natural gas and oil in response to fluctuations in the price of OCTG.  
Entry in to the industry is, in principle, fairly easy, and there are a large number of firms.  The 
industry structure is, however, both more complicated and much more concentrated than a 
simple count of the number of firms would suggest (see Table 5).  In the U.S., there are a small 
number of firms that produce a full line of steel tubes, casings, and line pipes, and sell that line to 
the industry.  These firms are often vertically integrated steel producers.  There are a large 
number of smaller firms that produce less than a full line of OCTG products.  These firms are 
usually not vertically integrated and instead purchase semi-finished steel inputs.  They often also 
purchase some OCTG or line pipe products from other manufacturers in order to offer a full line 
to their customers.  These firms often customize (with specialized coatings, etc.) products for 
their customers.  The U.S. firms sell primarily or exclusively to the North American market, 
which includes the Gulf of Mexico.  Otherwise, U.S. firms do not seem active in the export of 
OCTG.   
Other leading producers are located in Japan, Germany, France, Italy, Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, 
and Sweden.  These producers sell to both U.S. and worldwide markets.  Three large alliances, 
including all of the members of the former cartel, dominate world trade.  The largest alliance is 
that of an Italian-Argentine firm (Techint), which controls OCTG producers in Mexico, 
Argentina, Italy, and Canada.  These various relationships among steel tube producers, either as 
suppliers and customers, or as owners or partners in a joint venture, provide many opportunities 
for cooperation and may substantially lessen competition in the industry from what one would 
expect if these various industry participants were all independent competitors. 
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Internationally, the creation of alliances among major producers has also meant the consolidation 
of their sales forces.  In fact, in the case of the alliance among Nippon, Kawasaki, and Sumitomo 
Metal it appears that the alliance is essentially the creation of a joint sales agency to distribute 
their goods worldwide.52 The opportunity to combine its sales force with the existing 
international sales network of Techint (DST) was apparently central to NKK’s decision to spin 
off its OCTG unit to NKKTubes, which is now jointly owned by NKK and DST.53  While the 
use of a single, consolidated sales network may provide efficiencies in distribution or 
convenience for customers, it also make communication and coordination of prices and market 
shares much easier, and effectively prevents cheating by firms who have delegated sales to the 
joint distributor. 
Smaller, independent oil and gas producers may rely on brokers while larger firms have in recent 
years been more likely to establish direct, long-term relationships with OCTG producers.  For 
example, Pemex, the Mexican state-owned oil producer, entered into a long-term arrangement 
with Techint, whereby the Techint group provides just-in-time supplies of OCTG allowing 
Pemex to reduce its inventories to near zero.   
This kind of relationship, which has grown more prominent since the demise of the cartel in 
1995, has changed the structure of distribution in the industry.  In doing so, it has increased the 
competitive advantages associated with vertical integration and horizontal size, because being 
large and diversified is necessary to being able to guarantee supplies to customers in an industry 
with such high variance in demand.  It also has increased barriers to entry as customers are tied 
to long-term relationships. 
2. Price-Fixing Conspiracy and Its Effects 
It is unlikely that the cartel agreement had a direct impact on the U.S. market where prices are 
above world levels because of anti-dumping tariffs currently in effect.  There has been no 
antitrust case to date in the United States.  In December 1999, the European Commission fined 
                                                 
52 Audrey McAvoy, Japanese Steel Companies Discussing Seamless Steel Pipe Tie-Up, DOW JONES INTERNATIONAL 
NEWS (August 18, 1999). 
53 NKK Merges Seamless Pipe Operations in JV with Grupo Techint, DOW JONES INTERNATIONAL NEWS (November 
2, 1999). 
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four European and four Japanese steel manufacturers over $100 million, charging them with 
fixing bids on seamless steel tubes and line pipes between 1990 and 1995.  The European 
manufacturers included the inventor of steel tubes, Mannesmann; British Steel, now Corus, 
which exited the industry in 1994; Dalmine, indirectly owned at the time by the Italian 
government but privatized in 1996; Vallourec, a French steel producer who specializes in tubular 
products.  The Japanese conspirators were NKK, Kawasaki, Nippon, and Sumitomo Metal.  
These eight independent firms created a cartel organization called the “Europe Japan Club.”  
Under the auspices of the Europe Japan club they agreed “that the domestic markets of the 
different producers … should be respected” so that producers refrained from selling in the home 
countries of the other members of the Club.54  In shared markets, the Club met regularly and 
designated which company was to win a particular job by bidding an agreed upon price, with the 
others to submit higher bids. 
The European Commission decision covered restrictions on sales and pricing agreements in 
Europe.  According to the EC, the cartel agreement also restricted competition in “certain third 
markets.”  The fines issued by the EC did not reflect these non-European markets because, the 
Commission concluded, there was no evidence that they had a restrictive effect on the European 
Union.  Further details on this agreement have not been made public by the European 
Commission pending appeals by some of the accused.  Because the EC has not included these 
other “third markets” in its decision, it is likely that details regarding this aspect of the agreement 
will never be made public.  This points to an important weakness in international competition 
policy.  The competition authorities in Europe may well have information regarding restrictions 
on competition in developing countries (or other developed countries), but under current law and 
agreements there is often not permission, let alone responsibility, to share that information with 
the affected parties. 
We have detailed data for OCTG prices in the United States over the period in question.55  
However, because of the substantial tariffs in place during this period, these may not be a good 
proxy for worldwide prices.  Average prices of OCTG are presented in Figure 3.  (Note that 
                                                 
54 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Commission fines cartel of seamless steel tube producers for market sharing, European 
Commission Press Release (December 8, 1999). 
55 We are extremely grateful to Charlie Perkins of Pipe Logix for providing us with this data. 
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OCTG is produced in both electric resistance welded or ERW form and a seamless form.  The 
cartel exerted control over both products, and Figure 3 shows both price series.)  The OCTG 
price falls during most of the period of the conspiracy.  However, this was also a period of low 
and declining oil and gas prices.  Thus the observed prices, even in the U.S. where the cartel’s 
effect was presumably only indirect, may have been higher than they would have been under 
competitive conditions.  Further analysis, controlling for the price of oil and gas, is necessary to 
obtain a quantitative estimate of the effect of the cartel on prices. 
Price trends in the industry continue to mirror oil and gas prices.  U.S. prices fell during the early 
1990s, reaching a trough in mid-1995.  They then increased for three years until declines in oil 
prices in 1998 led to a 41% drop in U.S. OCTG demand and declining prices of OCTG.  By the 
middle of 1999, OCTG prices were again increasing, as they continued to do for most of 2000. 
The share of worldwide seamless tube exports coming from Germany, France, England, and 
Japan stayed roughly the same during the period of the cartel (Figure 4), actually increasing 
slightly toward the end of the period. As the cartel included the major producers from each of 
these countries, this measure is a reasonable estimate of cartel exports.  To the extent that there 
were alliances between the cartel participants and producers in other countries, this measure 
actually understates the market share of the cartel.  The fact that their market share does not 
decline suggests that entry (or expansion by non-participants) was not a viable source of 
increased competition during this period. 
No evidence was found indicating that steel producers blocked entry or potential entry into the 
OCTG market from developing country steel producers.  Several of the participants have 
production facilities in developing countries, including Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe.  It appears that any sales of OCTG by producers from 
Eastern Europe will be accomplished through cooperation with one of these international 
alliances. 
Since the demise of the cartel, the industry has undergone a fairly substantial reorganization, in 
which all parties to the cartel have joined in one of three international alliances.  The largest of 
these, with a 25% market share of world consumption of OCTG is led by the Techint, an Italian–
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Argentinean firm controlled by the Rocca family.  Techint controls Dalmine, the Italian member 
of the cartel, Tamsa, a Mexican tube producer, and Siderca, an Argentine steel producer.  They 
are known jointly as the DST group.  The Rocca family has been in the steel tube business since 
before World War II.  Tamsa is currently under investigation by the Mexican Federal 
Competition Commission for taking advantage of its position as the sole seamless tube producer 
in Mexico.  There is no indication in published reports that this investigation is linked to the 
European Commission charges.56 NKK, also a member of the Europe-Japan club, has now 
formed an alliance with DST, as has a Canadian producer. 
As mentioned above, the other three Japanese producers who were members of the cartel 
(Nippon, Kawasaki, and Sumitomo Metal) have formed an alliance in which they use a single 
sales agency to represent all three.  Mannesmann and Vallourec, the other two firms in the 
Europe-Japan Club have formed a joint venture to which they have transferred all their OCTG 
production.  They are also engaged in steel tube joint ventures with Corus, another member of 
the Club that has exited the OCTG market. 
China’s exports of seamless steel tubes have increased significantly, but the current focus of its 
steel tube producers is improving manufacturing technology and product quality rather than 
expansion of capacity for export.57  This suggests that, at least in the short run, China will not 
significantly increase competition for established producers. 
Tariffs continue to play a significant role in this industry and may well limit the entry of 
developing country firms not aligned with one of the three groups that dominate the industry.  
The European Union imposed anti-dumping duties on Ukraine and Croatia in February 2000.  It 
has had anti-dumping tariffs in force against six other East European countries since 1997.  
Tariffs have been maintained in U.S. since 1995 against Mexico and since 1994 against Japan.58  
The recently enacted steel tariffs specifically exclude OCTG from increased tariffs.59  Imports of 
                                                 
56 Mexico: Investigation into Tamsa, METAL BULLETIN, August 21, 2000, at 14.  
57 Chinese Steel Industry Will Mainly Develop Flat Products, ASIA PULSE (September 20, 2000).  
58 Sumitomo Anticipates OCTG Rebound, AMERICAN METAL MARKET (April, 5, 2001). 
59 President of the United States of America, Steel Products Proclamation: To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to 
Competition From Imports of Certain Steel Products, (March 5, 2002) at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020305-7.html. 
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pipe into the United States have increased in part because tariffs on steel sheets have encouraged 
foreign producers to export finished products into the U.S. 
D. Summary 
There are a number of lessons to draw from these three cases.  First, consider the potential for 
consumer welfare effects.  International cartels can clearly have worldwide effects, but until 
now, no one has examined this issue directly.  In certain cases these cartels significantly raised 
prices for several years.  These price increases were on sophisticated intermediate goods, which 
are passed on to both consumers and downstream producers.  It is particularly costly to the 
development process to raise prices and limit entry on this set of goods.  Without prosecution by 
government authorities, consumers lack the information, resources, and, in some cases, legal 
structure to protect their own interests. 
Second, the cases give us several insights into firm behavior and follow-on policy implications.  
One of the lessons is that access to technology and markets is actively limited by the cartels (or 
at least such attempts are made), using both governmental (tariff) barriers and private barriers.  
Governments must therefore be attentive to how they might inadvertently help to support cartel 
practices.  In addition, significant industry restructuring often follows the break-up of cartels, yet 
no antitrust authority seems to be watching to see if competition is being preserved during the 
restructuring. 
Also, we observe that some of these cartels came together during periods of increasing price 
competition, often following entry.  In general, we suspect that cartel formation may also follow 
periods of market integration.  Market integration alone, without vigorous anti-cartel 
enforcement, may give rise to increasing cartel activity rather than competition.  Increasing 
liberalization of international trade may have inadvertently, by increasing competition in 
formerly protected national markets, increased the incentives for firms to participate in cartels.  
Such a response undermines the process of international integration, and decreases the benefits 
of economic integration to consumers around the world.  It may also undermine political support 
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for international liberalization if citizens believe that private barriers to trade will simply replace 
government-created ones.60   
Finally, there is a regrettable lesson for empirical research.  The effects of private (as opposed to 
state run) international cartels on developing countries are quite difficult to determine, even on a 
case-study basis.  There is anecdotal evidence about prices and barriers to entry, but few 
definitive conclusions can be drawn.  There are enormous difficulties in estimating the 
quantitative impact of cartels on developing country incomes because of the secrecy under which 
cartels operate, the lack of antitrust prosecutions in developing countries themselves (leading to a 
lack of information on the activities of cartels in developing country markets), and the general 
lack of data on individual transactions that might have been influenced by the existence of a 
cartel.  For this reason, we turn to the trade data as a way to quantify, however roughly, the 
effects of contemporary international cartel activity on developing countries. 
IV. Estimate of Developing Country Trade Affected By Recent International Cartels 
It is impossible to gauge the true number of international cartels in existence in the 1990s.  
However, we do know that the U.S. Department of Justice and the European Commission have 
recently successfully prosecuted at least forty-two different international price-fixing 
conspiracies that were in force at some point in the past decade.  The surge in U.S. prosecutions 
of international cartels stems primarily from the revision and expansion of the Antitrust 
Division’s corporate amnesty program in 1993.  The number of corporations coming forward and 
seeking amnesty rose from roughly one corporation per year to one per month.61  On the heels of 
                                                 
60 We should note that some of the cartels in our cross-section sample, discussed in the next section, clearly pre-date 
recent moves toward international liberalization. 
61 Speech by Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Opening Markets and Protecting 
Competition for America’s Businesses and Consumers: Goals and Achievements of the Antitrust Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Fiscal Year 1993 through March 1996, March 27, 1996, at 8.  See also Howard Adler Jr. and 
David J. Laing, The Explosion of International Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, BUS. CRIMES BULLETIN: 
COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION (March 1997).  Adler and Laing state, for example, that “In 1991, only 1 percent of 
corporate defendants were foreign and no foreign individuals were charged that year.  From July 1996 to January 
1997, 20 percent of all corporations and 27 percent of all individuals charged were foreigners.” (p. 1) 
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this increased enforcement by the U.S., both the European Union as well as some non-European 
countries have strengthened their anti-cartel laws and stepped up enforcement.62  
From these recent international price-fixing cases, we have created a sample of forty-two 
international cartels on which the cross-section analysis in this paper is based (Table 6).  We 
believe that this is close to the universe of international cartels that have been successfully 
prosecuted by the United States or the European Commission for fixing prices during the 1990s.  
Table 6 summarizes the dates of cartel operation, the legal entity (i.e., the U.S. or the EC) that 
prosecuted the case, the country of origin of the indicted firms, whether firms from developing 
countries are known to be participants in the price-fixing arrangement, and, finally, which 
country or countries are known to be affected (as consumers) by the cartel.  In order to appear in 
this table, a cartel must satisfy the following five conditions:  1) it must involve more than one 
producer (otherwise, we consider it an extension of monopoly power case); 2) it must include 
firms from more than one country; 3) it must have attempted to set prices or allocate markets; 4) 
it must have existed during part or all of the 1990s (so, for example, there are cartels in our 
sample that began in the 1980s and ended in the 1990s); and, 5) it must have been successfully 
prosecuted by the U.S. or EU (or both).  This sample, like its intellectual antecedents, may be 
biased as a result of its dependency on prosecution as a sample selection criterion.63  
Table 7 shows reported market concentration figures and cartel price increase information for 
selected cartels.  The typical international cartel has operated in a highly concentrated market (in 
those cases where we can find the information).  Estimates of the increase in price resulting from 
these cartels vary widely by industry.  At the low end, for example, we have a price increase of 
ten percent for the thermal fax paper cartel, which was formed as the industry was declining and 
lasted for less than a year.  At the high end there is the price increase estimate of 100 percent for 
the stainless steel cartel, and 50-60 percent in the U.S. and 90 percent in Canada for the graphite 
electrodes cartel.   
                                                 
62 See, for example, Michael Reynolds, EU Briefings, 18 INT’L FINANCIAL L. REV. 48 (1999).  The article announces 
the decision within the European Commission to create a new unit to fight cartel activity. 
63 See Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAW ECON. 365 (1970); George A. 
Hay and Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J. LAW ECON. 13 (1974); Peter 
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In order to determine whether developing countries were consumers of one of the cartelized 
products in the sample, we matched the products in Table 6 with import-export data for the 
sample period.  The trade data come from Robert Feenstra’s, World Trade Flows, 1980-1997, 
With Production And Tariff Data (Center for International Data, Institute of Governmental 
Affairs, University of California – Davis, 1999).  The data include trade flows (imports and 
exports) for all countries, classified according to the Standard International Trade Classification 
(SITC), Revision 2.64  The data include only trade in goods.  The list of developing countries is 
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/2001.65 
Tables 8 through 13 summarize import data for thirty-two of the cartelized products in Table 6 
for 1997, the most recent year for which trade data are available.66  The sample size falls from 
the forty-two to thirty-two for two reasons.  First, the data on trade flows exclude services, so 
cartels that fixed prices on services were ruled out for further analysis.  Second, goods were 
dropped from the sample where the data appeared to be misclassified or aggregated to such a 
level that no reasonable match to the cartel product could be made.  Tables 8 through 10 contain 
a combination of less aggregated and more aggregated data.  Whenever possible, the narrower, 
4-digit SITC product code, was used to track the trade data, but if the data were missing for that 
category, we then used the broader, 3-digit code to categorize the cartel product.  Tables 11 
through 13 use less aggregated classifications (4-digit SITC codes only), and the number of 
products for which we can obtain data falls to nineteen.  Even then, the SITC codes are, 
unfortunately, often broader than the product affected by cartel behavior.  We indicate 
                                                 
64 Countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union are conspicuous by their absence from World Trade Flows.  
Thus, the data on imports, exports, and Gross Domestic Product presented here simply exclude those developing 
countries that were formerly a part of the Soviet Union.  There are also cases where World Trade Flows grouped 
smaller countries together (especially smaller island countries).  We do not believe that this leads to any substantial 
misclassification in the data presented here. 
65 According to the World Bank’s classification, there are 155 developing countries, divided into three groups (low-
income, lower-middle-income, and upper-middle-income) and 52 “high income” countries.  Examples of “low-
income” countries are Armenia, India, and Vietnam; examples of “lower-middle” are Albania, China, and Thailand; 
and, examples of “upper-middle” are Argentina, Czech Republic, and Turkey.  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
figures are calculated from World Bank data (www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html).  The World 
Bank provides detailed data on its website with country-specific statistics.  The figures for total GDP by country 
categories are based on the same set of countries as those in the World Trade Flows sample. 
66 These are the products for which we have been able to find minimally reliable data in international trade statistics.  
These data problems are discussed further below. 
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discrepancies between the cartelized products and the SITC categories in the notes to Tables 8 – 
13.  
Tables 8 and 11 report 1997 imports of “cartel-affected” products as a percent of total imports to 
developing countries (using more and less aggregated product definitions, respectively) with 
countries aggregated by income categories.  Tables 9 and 12 present 1997 import data for these 
same products, showing them as a percent of total GDP.  Tables 10 and 13 give the total dollar 
value of cartel-affected imports.  We also report in each of these tables, just for comparison, the 
analogous import values for high-income countries.  In all of these tables we have deleted the 
cartels that dealt with services, but we have left in the names of each of the thirty-five cartel 
goods, so that it is easy to see where the missing data problems occur.  For example, in Tables 8-
10, we do not even have 3-digit data for explosives, nucleotides, or zinc phosphates (thus, the 
sample size falls to thirty-two).  The number of products with missing data grows to sixteen in 
Tables 11-13, where we try to find 4-digit SITC category matches. 
Although Tables 8-10 cover a larger sample size, the product definitions are often much too 
broad.  We therefore focus on Tables 11-13.  Examining the sub-sample of nineteen products – 
those products that were cartelized at some point during the 1990s and for which we were able to 
obtain a good match to the trade data – the total value of such “cartel-affected” imports to 
developing countries was $54.7 billion (see the last row in Table 13).  This figure made up 5.2% 
of all imports to developing countries in 1997 and equaled 1.2% of their combined GDP.  The 
impact appears to be largest on the most developed countries of the developing world.  Cartel-
affected imports made up 5.6% of imports and 1.3% of GDP for the “upper middle income” 
countries who have the income and industries that demand and rely on imports of sophisticated 
intermediate manufactured goods.  While the total value of cartel-affected imports is higher for 
high-income countries ($157.9 billion compared to $54.7 billion), these imports represent a 
smaller proportion of imports and GDP (4.6% and 0.9% respectively).  Of course, in countries 
where producers belonged to the cartel, domestic production as well as imports is affected by 
cartel behavior. 
Using more aggregated data, we can obtain data on trade for almost all industries in which firms 
have been convicted of fixing the price of goods (32 of 35 industries).  This sample is more 
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comprehensive, in that it includes all cartelized goods, but it is also less accurate, because the 
data include trade in many products that were presumably not affected by cartel behavior.  Thus, 
these figures present an upper bound to the value of affected trade in these industries.   This 
upper bound for the total value of affected trade is $155.9 billion of developing country imports, 
representing 12.2% of their imports and 2.8% of their GDP (Tables 8 - 10).  
These numbers clearly do not represent an exact value of the imports to developing countries 
affected by all international cartels.  The estimates are, on the one hand, biased downward 
because we include only some of the forty-two known price-fixing conspiracies.  At the same 
time, even our lower estimate of affected trade, including only nineteen products, includes cases 
where the trade categories are broader than the products whose prices were fixed by the cartel.  
In general, when interpreting the trade data it must be kept in mind that some of the cartel 
product-SITC matches are poor.  These estimates are intended to give a sense of the order of 
magnitude of affected trade, not an exact measure. 
We can illustrate the typical problems with the data by using the citric acid, graphite electrodes, 
and seamless steel tubes cartels again as illustrative cases.  We have not been able to obtain 
accurate international trade data for citric acid.  Therefore, citric acid simply does not appear in 
Tables 11-13.  As with other narrowly specified chemicals, we suspect that there is 
misclassification in the trade data, but whatever the source of the problem, volume of trade in 
citric acid is simply not available.  Even if we did have import measures they would understate 
the full impact of the cartel on developing country consumers who pay higher prices not only for 
raw citric acid, but also for a wide range of citric-acid containing goods.  We can, however, 
obtain data for the broader category of “carboxylic acids and their anhydrides and halides.”  This 
latter category is so broad that it contains at least five different products that have been affected 
by cartels.  We use data on trade in “carboxylic acids and their anhydrides and halides” in Tables 
8 – 10, but there are surely other products in that category in which there is no cartel activity. 
For graphite electrodes the situation is slightly better.  Table 11 suggests that graphite electrodes 
constitute a significant fraction of developing country imports (0.95%).  Graphite electrodes are 
important to developing countries that manufacture steel using the EAF process, but the data that 
we present here undoubtedly vastly overstates their value, as this import category includes not 
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only graphite electrodes, but all “otherwise unclassified electrical equipment.”  This broader 
category again includes more than one cartel product, as carbon cathode blocks also fall into this 
same catchall.  On the other hand, if we did have a good match to graphite electrodes, that 
measure would understate the impact of the cartel on trade because the product is an 
intermediate good that is also imported into the developing country in a more processed state.  
To the extent that the graphite electrode cartel increased the price of steel imports to developing 
countries, focusing on graphite electrode imports understates the impact of the cartel.  Therefore, 
the data must be read with a degree of skepticism. 
The OCTG cartel-trade data match is also problematic.  This category (seamless tubes and pipes; 
blanks for tubes and pipes) is much broader than the oil and gas goods that were included in this 
particular conspiracy.  However, there have been recent European Commission decisions 
convicting an overlapping set of steel producers for fixing the price of steel heating pipes, steel 
beams, pre-insulated pipes, and stainless steel during the late-1980s to mid-1990s.67  Thus, it is 
possible that the prices of the other steel pipe products included in these import data have been 
affected by these various activities.  Some imports included in these figures were certainly 
produced by firms who were not a party to these agreements.  However, given the substantial 
market shares of the firms in the cartel, it is likely that their behavior changed the prices charged 
by firms who were not a party to and not even aware of the price fixing of their larger 
competitors.  Without more information about the secret activities of cartels, it is impossible to 
determine the quantitative effect of these cartels on developing country incomes.   
Even with these qualifications, it is clear from the magnitude of these figures that cartels have 
adversely affected a not insignificant portion of the trade, and therefore the trade balance, and 
consumption of developing countries.  (Following the industrial organization literature, we focus 
on trade and consumption, though the impact on the trade balance is not an unimportant issue in 
a period in which some developing countries have experienced severe currency crises.)  Given 
the actual and potential effects on trade that reach into the tens of billions of dollars, a natural 
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question to ask is why these many affected countries are not seeking damages from cartel 
member firms in their home countries.  In particular, given that the United States has the 
strongest laws and enforcement record against price-fixing, a legal mechanism for civil suits 
(which, the European Union, for example, does not have for antitrust violations), and some of the 
richest companies, why is it that there are relatively few lawsuits brought by foreign companies 
seeking damages?  Not surprisingly, given the many recent international cartel prosecutions, 
there are a number of parties interested in this issue.  The question of whether U.S. antitrust law 
can be applied to foreign transactions has recently become a lively legal issue, and it is one that 
we turn to now. 
V. Foreign Plaintiffs’ Access to U.S. Courts in International Cartel Cases  
Consumers in developing countries harmed by the activities of international cartels may be 
unable to pursue legal remedies in their own countries, either because domestic antitrust laws 
prohibiting such behavior do not exist, do not provide adequate remedies, or are not enforced by 
the relevant authorities.  In many such instances, those consumers may look to U.S. law instead 
for remedies for the antitrust injuries they have suffered.  The ability of such plaintiffs to sue in 
U.S. courts is restricted, however, by the fact that U.S. antitrust laws do not reach all 
anticompetitive conduct.  Rather, U.S. antitrust laws apply to “anticompetitive conduct directed 
at foreign markets that directly affects the competitiveness of domestic markets,” but not to 
“anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign markets that only affects the competitiveness of 
foreign markets.”68  In determining whether U.S. antitrust laws will apply to specific acts, the 
courts look to the effect of the anticompetitive conduct, not the situs of that conduct.69  This 
“effects” test can thus subject defendants whose anticompetitive conduct occurred solely outside 
the U.S. to suit in U.S. courts, where the effects of that conduct are felt in the United States. 
Historically, U.S. courts have not been particularly sympathetic to the claims of foreign antitrust 
plaintiffs whose claims arise from anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign markets.  
However, a March 2002 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Kruman v. 
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Christie’s International PLC,70 has suggested a broader mechanism by which foreign plaintiffs 
can pursue legal remedies in the U.S. courts for the anticompetitive behavior of international 
cartels.  
The access of foreign antitrust plaintiffs to U.S. courts is largely governed by the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) of 1982,71 which Congress enacted in an effort to clarify 
application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct and to limit application of U.S. antitrust 
laws when non-import foreign trade is involved.  In particular, Section 6a of the FTAIA 
provides, in relevant part, that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or 
commerce . . . with foreign nations unless . . . such conduct has a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect . . . on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with 
foreign nations and such effect gives rise to a claim under” the Sherman Act.72  
Until the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Kruman, all of the federal courts which addressed 
this issue agreed that the FTAIA requires foreign plaintiffs suing under U.S. antitrust law to 
show:  (1) that the alleged anticompetitive behavior had a “direct, substantial and reasonably 
foreseeable effect” on the U.S. marketplace and (2) that an anticompetitive effect on the U.S. 
marketplace gave rise to the plaintiff’s claimed injuries.73  The coupling of these two 
requirements effectively bars many foreign plaintiffs from suing in U.S. courts for international 
cartel activities.  To proceed, plaintiffs must be able to show that their injuries were caused 
specifically by the anticompetitive effect of the defendant’s conduct on the U.S. marketplace and 
not by anticompetitive conduct that affects a worldwide market, even if that market includes the 
United States.  
In Ferromin International Trade Corp. v. UCAR International, Inc.,74 for example, 27 plaintiffs 
had alleged that they suffered injury as a result of price fixing and market allocation in the 
worldwide market for graphite electrodes between 1992 and 1997.  The U.S district court 
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dismissed the claims of 16 of the plaintiffs, stating that although the plaintiffs had alleged a 
number of anticompetitive effects upon the U.S. marketplace resulting from the defendants’ 
conduct, the plaintiffs had not alleged that their injuries stemmed from the effect of the higher 
prices for graphite electrodes in the U.S. market (as opposed to higher prices in other, foreign 
markets).  Indeed, the court found that the higher prices paid by those foreign plaintiffs were 
caused by anticompetitive effects in foreign countries, not in the U.S.  The court allowed the 
claims of the remaining 11 plaintiffs to go forward, however, because some of the electrodes 
purchased by these plaintiffs were invoiced in the U.S., thus satisfying the “causal requirement” 
that these plaintiffs were injured as a result of higher prices in the U.S. marketplace.75 
In its recent decision in Kruman, however, the Second Circuit deviated from prevailing 
precedent on the meaning of Section 6a of the FTAIA, opening the door to more suits by foreign 
plaintiffs.  In a sense, the Kruman decision was a narrow one, as it was based specifically upon 
existing Second Circuit precedent, and thus its impact on the law of other circuits is uncertain.  
In another sense, however, the Kruman decision was of wide-ranging impact, both because of the 
prominence of the Second Circuit and because the decision created a circuit split on an issue of 
significant importance – the availability of U.S. antitrust remedies to foreign plaintiffs who were 
harmed by anticompetitive conduct directed at least in part to a foreign marketplace.  The legal 
and policy implications of the Kruman decision are substantial and deserve careful exploration, 
as the issue may well end up before the U.S. Supreme Court for ultimate resolution.76  
The Kruman court rejected the two-step test articulated by all other federal courts addressing this 
issue.  Specifically, the court determined that the FTAIA had not altered prior law in the Second 
Circuit with respect to the nature of the effect that anticompetitive conduct directed at foreign 
markets must have on the domestic marketplace in order to be actionable under U.S. antitrust 
laws. Under the Second Circuit’s National Bank of Canada rule,77  “anticompetitive conduct 
directed at foreign markets is only regulated by the Sherman Act if it has the ‘effect’ of causing 
injury to domestic commerce by (1) reducing the competitiveness of a domestic market; or (2) 
                                                 
75 Id. at 706. 
76 A detailed analysis of the Kruman decision is outside the scope of this paper, but we plan on addressing this issue 
in future research. 
77 See National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Assoc., 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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making possible anticompetitive conduct directed at domestic commerce.”78  The first prong of 
this test encompasses anticompetitive conduct that is directed toward both foreign and domestic 
markets and that actually reduces the competitiveness of the domestic market.  The second prong 
encompasses anticompetitive conduct that is “directed only at a foreign market, but has the effect 
of allowing a separate course of conduct that directly affects the competitiveness of . . . domestic 
markets.”79  
The effect of the Second Circuit’s rule is to allow antitrust suits to proceed in instances in which 
other federal courts would find the FTAIA prohibited such suits.  The plaintiffs in Kruman were 
buyers and sellers at foreign auctions who alleged that they were overcharged for auction 
services in auctions held outside the U.S. as a result of a price-fixing conspiracy by the 
defendants.  (A separate suit was brought by plaintiffs who alleged they had been overcharged 
for auction services in auctions held in the U.S. as a result of domestic price-fixing conspiracy by 
the same defendants.)  Because the plaintiffs had alleged only that they had paid inflated prices 
at foreign auctions, the district court dismissed their claims, stating that they had not satisfied the 
FTAIA’s requirements.  While the imposition of high prices overseas may have had an effect 
ultimately on the U.S. marketplace, the plaintiffs had not alleged that this domestic effect gave 
rise to their injuries.80  
The Second Circuit reversed, noting that the plaintiffs had alleged that the domestic price-fixing 
scheme could not have succeeded in the absence of the foreign price-fixing scheme.  If this was 
true, the foreign conduct clearly had an anticompetitive effect upon the domestic market.  The 
“conduct” at issue could be described as an agreement to fix prices in both foreign and domestic 
markets, which conduct clearly has an effect upon domestic markets because it includes conduct 
directed at a domestic market.  Alternatively, the “conduct” could be “described as an agreement 
to fix prices in the foreign auction market that made possible an agreement to fix prices in the 
domestic auction market.”81  In either event, one of the prongs of the National Bank of Canada 
rule is met, and the FTAIA would not bar the plaintiffs from bringing suit in a U.S. court. 
                                                 
78Kruman, 2002 U.S. App. Lexis 3895, at *5-*6.  
79 Id. at *22. 
80 Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 129 F. Supp.2d 620 (S.D. N.Y. 2001). 
81 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3895 at *40. 
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Without ruling on the issue, the Second Circuit discussed the applicability of its ruling to 
international cartels.  In identifying the type of conduct that would satisfy the first prong of its 
National Bank of Canada test (i.e., conduct that would have the effect of injuring domestic 
commerce by reducing the competitiveness of a domestic market), the court provided the 
example of an international cartel whose anticompetitive behavior was directed at both domestic 
and foreign markets, and stated that “the FTAIA was clearly intended to regulate such 
conduct.”82  
The Kruman court did limit the scope of the conduct that could be regulated by U.S. antitrust 
laws.  The defendants had argued that given the nature of the modern global economy, with its 
global marketplaces, any anticompetitive conduct that affects foreign markets could conceivably 
affect the U.S. economy and so lead to a suit under U.S. antitrust laws.  The Kruman court 
rejected this line of reasoning, however, noting that under its test, such conduct would be 
actionable only if it caused injury to domestic commerce through an anticompetitive effect or by 
making possible anticompetitive acts directed at domestic commerce.  In addition, the court 
noted that the FTAIA itself also limited the reach of the antitrust laws by requiring that the 
“effect” of the conduct be “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable,”83 stating that this 
standard would prevent conduct with a merely “ancillary effect” upon U.S. markets from being 
actionable under U.S. antitrust laws. 
At this point, we have many questions and few answers regarding the Second Circuit’s ruling.  
There are significant jurisprudential and policy issues raised by this decision.  On the legal side, 
for example, the Kruman ruling leaves open issues of proof (will they be insurmountable for the 
foreign plaintiffs?) and how to measure the remedies.  On the policy side, questions about the 
costs and benefits of this decision, if it stands, are numerous.  For instance, what does the U.S. 
have to gain by allowing such lawsuits to proceed?  Is it primarily an additional instrument of 
deterrence against anticompetitive behavior?  How can we gauge whether the benefits to the 
degree of market competition in the U.S. as a result of this rule with outweigh costs to the U.S. 
legal system?  These questions highlight an important avenue for future research. 
                                                 
82 Id. at *39 n.9. 
83 15 U.S.C. §6as (quoted id. at *42). 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this investigation of the effects of international cartels on developing countries we have 
addressed both developing countries as consumers, as well as developing countries as 
competitors or co-conspirators.  The cases discussed show the potential for an international cartel 
made up of producers from industrialized countries to have simultaneously harmful effects on 
developing country consumers and harmful or beneficial effects on developing country 
producers.   
The multi-dimensional role that U.S. and EU governments play in responding to these cartels has 
varied effects on developing countries.  The vigorous prosecution of international cartels by the 
U.S. and EC may well open up entry possibilities to developing country producers.  On the other 
hand, these governments are also susceptible to manipulation by domestic producers using tariff 
barriers and anti-dumping duties to protect the home market, either during or after the 
conspiracy.  As raised in the previous section, impending legal decisions on whether to take a 
narrow or broad view of the application of U.S. antitrust law will have a direct effect on damages 
suffered by developing countries from international cartels.   
Finally, there is the role of the antitrust authorities in holding confidential certain information 
that could clarify the effect of cartels on developing country consumers and producers.  In 
general, although U.S. and EC decisions often mention that a cartel had effects “in the U.S. and 
elsewhere” or in “certain third markets,” those effects are never included in calculating 
punishments.  Details regarding the effects of the cartels outside of U.S. and EU markets will, in 
general, never be made public.  This points to an important weakness in international 
competition policy as it affects developing countries.  The competition authorities may well have 
information regarding restrictions on competition in developing countries, but under current law 
and agreements there is often not permission, let alone responsibility, to share that information 
with the affected parties.  These and other issues will need to be addressed as international 
anticompetitive conduct collides with national competition policies. 
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TABLE 1 
CITRIC ACID:  CAPACITY AND MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR FIRMS 
 
Firm Name Capacity – 1990a 
(million lbs/yr) 
Capacity – 1995a 
(million lbs/yr) 
U.S. Capacity – 
1999b (million 
lbs/yr) 
Global Cartel 
Market Share – 
1991c 
Global Cartel 
Market Share – 
1995c 
Pfizer/ADMd 140 180    
ADM   200 12% 8% 
Bayer/Haarmann & 
Reimer 
140 150  24% 14% 
Cargill 55 160 165   
A.E. Staley (a 
division of Tate & 
Lyle) 
  135   
Jungbunzlauer 132 463  11% 21% 
Bayer 90 160    
Hoffmann-La 
Roche 
77e 154  13% 7% 
Biocor (Italy) 53 88    
Palcitric (Italy) 0 77    
Citurgia 
Biochemicals 
     
China (various 
companies) 
186 535    
Aktiva 0 66    
Godot Israel 20e 40e    
World Capacity, 
except for former 
USSR 
877 2,230    
World 
Consumptione 
850 1,560    
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Firm Name Capacity – 1990a 
(million lbs/yr) 
Capacity – 1995a 
(million lbs/yr) 
U.S. Capacity – 
1999b (million 
lbs/yr) 
Global Cartel 
Market Share – 
1991c 
Global Cartel 
Market Share – 
1995c 
Europe 
consumptione 
339 555    
U.S. consumption 
estimatese 
300 475    
U.S. exportse 17 52    
U.S. imports 65 125    
 TOTAL CARTEL MARKET SHARE 60% 50% 
 
 
 
Notes for Table 1: 
a The numbers in the first two capacity columns are from Connor (1998), Table 1.  There are always differences in estimates of capacity.  For 
example, a 1994 Chemical Marketing Reporter article "Citric Acid Market Grows with ‘New Age’ Drink Sales" contains different estimates for 
U.S. production capacity:  ADM is reported at 180 million pounds instead of Connor's 140, Haarmann & Reimer at 150 (same as Connor), and 
Cargill at 130 instead of Connor's 160. 
b Purchasing Magazine September 7, 2000. 
c Global market share based on capacity:  Connor (1998), Table 4. 
d ADM acquired Pfizer’s North Carolina plant in December 1990, and Pfizer continued to supply citric acid from its Groton plant until mid-1993 
when the plant was closed:  Connor (1998), p. 22. 
e Estimate by Connor (1998), p. 23. 
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TABLE 2 
CARTEL MEMBERS AND GOVERNMENT FINES:  CITRIC ACID AND GRAPHITE ELECTRODES 
 
CITRIC ACID  GRAPHITE ELECTRODES 
Firm Name Fine  Firm Name Fine 
ADM (U.S.) $30m (DOJ) 
$2m (Canada) 
€36.7m (EU) 
 UCAR (U.S.) $110m (DOJ) 
$11m (Canada) 
€50.4m (EU) 
Bayer/Haarmann & Reimer 
(Germany/U.S.) 
$50m (DOJ) 
$4.7m (Canada) 
€14.22m (EU) 
 SGL (Germany) $135m (DOJ) 
$12.5m (Canada) 
€80.2m (EU) 
Jungbunzlauer Intl. AG 
(Switzerland) 
$11m (DOJ) 
$1.9m (Canada) 
€17.64m (EU) 
 Carbide/Graphite Group (U.S.) Granted leniency (DOJ) 
€10.3m (EU) 
Hoffmann-La Roche 
(Switzerland) 
$14m (DOJ) 
€63.5m (EU) 
 Showa Denko (Japan) $32.5m (DOJ) 
€17.4m (EU) 
Cerestar Bioproducts BV 
(Dutch subsidiary of the 
French agricultural 
products firm Eridania 
Beghin-Say SA) 
$400,000 (DOJ) 
€0.17m (EU) 
 Tokai Carbon (Japan) $6m (DOJ) 
€24.5m (EU) 
   SEC Corp (Japan) $4.8m (DOJ) 
€12.2m (EU) 
   Nippon Carbon (Japan) $2.5m (DOJ) 
€12.2m (EU) 
   VAW Aluminum (Germany) €11.6m (EU) 
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TABLE 3 
GRAPHITE ELECTRODES:  CAPACITY AND MARKET SHARES OF MAJOR FIRMS 
 
Firm Name U.S. Market Share  
(at time of conspiracy, 
as reported by DOJ) 
World Market Share 
(1999, as stated in 
Ferromin complaint) 
UCAR 34% 31% 
SGL 23% 27% 
Carbide/Graphite 
Group 
18% 6% 
Showa Denko 18% 6% 
Tokai Carbon 1% 11% 
SEC Corp  5% 
Nippon Carbon  4% 
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TABLE 4  
GLOBAL ELECTRIC ARC FURNACE PRODUCTION IN 2000 
 
Region Production 
(million metric tons) 
Oxygen 
% 
Electric 
% 
Open Hearth 
% 
EU 163.2 60.3 39.7 0 
Other Europe 46.5 56.8 41.7 1.6 
Former USSR 98.6 54.6 12.5 32.9 
NAFTA 133.8 51.5 48.5  
Central & South 
America 
40.3 65.0 35.0  
Africa 13.4 49.3 50.1  
Middle East 10.6 20.8 79.2  
Asia 330.3 62.1 28.5 1.7 
WORLD 845.8 58.6 33.8 4.6 
 
 
Source:  International Iron and Steel Institute, Trends and Indicators: World Steel Production Data, at http://www.worldsteel.org/trends_prod/prod06 (visited 
November 2000). 
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TABLE 5  
OCTG:  MAJOR WORLDWIDE PRODUCERS 
 
Corporate Name Location(s) of 
OCTG production
Cartel 
Participant 
Grupo DST (Techint)   
NKK (allied with DST) Japan Yes 
Dalmine (part of DST group) 
   Formerly owned by Ilva SpA 
Italy Yes 
Siderca (part of DST group) Argentina No 
Tamsa (part of DST group) Mexico No 
NKKTubes (joint venture of NKK and 
Siderca) 
  
Algoma Seamless Tubulars Canada No 
   
Vallourec-Mannesmann Alliance   
Mannesmann AG   
Mannesmann Rohren-Werke Germany Yes 
Mannesmann Handel (now owned by 
Thyssen) 
Germany Investigated, 
but not fined 
Mannesmann SA Brazil Brazil  
Vallourec  France Yes 
Vallourec & Mannesmann Tubes 
(V&M Tubes or V&M do Brasil, joint 
venture of Mannesmann and 
Vallourec) 
Brazil No 
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Corporate Name Location(s) of 
OCTG production
Cartel 
Participant 
Europipe (jointly owned by 
Mannesmann, Usinor, and Corus) 
Germany, France, 
US 
Investigated, 
but not fined 
Thyssen Stahlunion (owns small share 
of Mannesmann Rohren-Werke) 
Germany Investigated, 
but not fined 
   
“Japanese” Alliance   
Kawasaki Japan Yes 
Nippon Steel Japan Yes 
Sumitomo Metal (Sumitomo 
Deutschland) 
Japan Yes 
   
Other Producers   
Sandvik Steel Sweden, US, 
Canada, Czech 
Republic, France, 
Germany, India 
No 
Corus (formerly British Steel) UK Yes 
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TABLE 6 
 
RECENT INTERNATIONAL CARTELS INVESTIGATED BY  
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Industry Start1 End Conviction  Country of Origin of Indicted 
Firms 
Developing 
Country 
Participants 
Country(ies) 
Known To Be 
Affected2 
Aluminum Phosphide Jan 1990 Nov  1990 DOJ Brazil, Germany, India, US Brazil, India US 
Beer 1993 1998 EC Belgium, France No Belgium 
Bromine Products Jul 1995 Apr 1998 DOJ Israel, US No US 
Cable-Stayed Bridges Sep 1996 Dec 1997 DOJ France, US No US 
Carbon Cathode Block Feb 1996 Dec 1997 DOJ Germany, Japan, US No US and elsewhere 
Carbonless Paper 1992 1995 EC France, Germany, Spain, South 
Africa, UK 
South Africa Europe 
Cartonboard 1986 1991 EC3  Austria, Canada, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, UK, US (via European 
subsidiaries) 
No Europe 
Cement 1983 Aug 1994 EC 33 European firms, 8 national 
cement trade associations, and 
the European Cement 
Association 
No Europe 
Citric Acid 1991 1995 DOJ & EC Austria, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, US 
No International 
Explosives 1988 1992 DOJ Norway, UK, US No US 
Ferrosilicon Oct 1989 June 1991 DOJ Germany, Norway, US No International 
Ferry Operators (Adriatic 
Sea) 
1987 1994 EC Greece, Italy No Greece, Italy 
Ferry Operators (Cross-
Channel Freight) 
Oct 1992 Dec 1992 EC France, Netherlands, Sweden, 
UK 
No Europe 
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Industry Start1 End Conviction  Country of Origin of Indicted 
Firms 
Developing 
Country 
Participants 
Country(ies) 
Known To Be 
Affected2 
Fine Arts Apr 1993 Dec 1999 DOJ (EC issued 
“Statement of 
Objections” on 
April 19, 2002) 
UK, US No Australia, Japan, 
United States, 
Europe 
Graphite Electrodes Jul 1992 Jun 1997 DOJ & EC Germany, Japan, US No International 
Isostatic Graphite Jul 1993 Feb 1998 DOJ Japan, US No Canada, US  
Laminated Plastic Tubes 1987 1996 DOJ  Switzerland, US No US 
Lysine Jun 1992 Jun 1995 DOJ & EC Germany, Japan, South Korea, 
US 
South Korea International 
Maltol Dec 1989 Dec 1995 DOJ US + unnamed firms No US and elsewhere 
Marine Construction 
Services (Heavy-Lift) 
1993 1997 DOJ Netherlands, US 
 
No US and elsewhere 
Marine Transportation 
Services (Heavy-Lift) 
1990 1995 DOJ Belgium, US No US and elsewhere 
Monochloroacetic Acid Sep 1995 Aug 1999 DOJ France, Netherlands No NA 
Nucleotides Jul 1992 Aug 1996 DOJ Japan, South Korea South Korea NA 
Organic Peroxides 1997 1998 DOJ France + unnamed firms NA NA 
Plastic Dinnerware Nov 1991 Apr 1992 DOJ Canada, US No US 
Shipping (Central West 
African) 
1972 1992 EC (conviction, 
but fine 
overturned) 
Zaire, Angola, Northern part of 
continental Europe, excluding 
UK 
Zaire, Angola NA 
Shipping (Far East) 1991 1994 EC 30 countries Malaysia, 
South Korea 
International 
Shipping (French-African) 1975 1992 EC 12 countries e.g., Senegal, 
Cameroon 
France, Senegal, 
Gabon, Central 
African Republic, 
Niger, Burkina, 
Faso, Guinea, 
Congo, Mali, Togo, 
and Cameroon 
Shipping (North Atlantic) 1994 1996 EC 11 countries e.g., Poland International 
Sodium Erythorbate Jul 1992 Dec 1994 DOJ US + unnamed firms No US 
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Industry Start1 End Conviction  Country of Origin of Indicted 
Firms 
Developing 
Country 
Participants 
Country(ies) 
Known To Be 
Affected2 
Sodium Gluconate Aug 1993 June 1995 DOJ & EC France, Japan, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, US 
No International 
Sorbates 1979 1996 DOJ Germany, Japan, US No International 
Stainless Steel Jan 1994 Mar 1995 EC Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK 
No Europe 
Steel Beam 1988 1994 EC Belgium, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Spain, UK 
No W. Europe 
Steel Heating Pipe 
(Pre-Insulated Pipe) 
late 1990 1996 EC Austria, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, 
Switzerland 
No Europe 
Steel Tube, Seamless 1990 1995 EC France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
UK 
No Europe and “certain 
third markets” 
Sugar Jun 1986 Jul 1990 EC Denmark, Ireland, UK No UK 
Tampico Fiber Jan 1990 Apr 1995 DOJ Mexico, Netherlands, US Mexico US 
Thermal Fax Paper 1991 1992 DOJ (1 Japanese 
firm went to trial 
and won) 
Japan, US No North America 
Vitamins Jan 1990 Feb 1999 DOJ & EC Canada, Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland, US 
No International 
Wastewater Construction Jun 1988 Jan 1995 DOJ Germany, Switzerland, US No Egypt 
Zinc Phosphate Mar 1994 May 1998 EC France, Germany, Norway, UK No Europe 
 
Notes to Table 6: 
1. Cartel dates are approximate.  In particular, indictments of different firms may list different conspiracy dates.  Also, for those cartels 
prosecuted by both the DOJ and EC, we list the DOJ dates only; sometimes the EC cases will have different dates.  In general, the information 
presented in this table was gathered from various industry and government sources, including DOJ and EC press releases, European Court of 
Justice decisions, and industry and business news sources, such as American Metal Market, Chemical Marketing Reporter, European Business 
Week, International Cement Magazine, Oil and Gas Journal, and Wall Street Journal.  Specific sources are available from the authors upon 
request. 
2. Information on "Country(ies) Known To Be Affected" reported in this table comes from DOJ and EC press releases, indictments, and rulings, 
as well as articles in the press.  These documents, of course, focus on the effects in either the United States or Europe.  In most cases there is 
no information from these sources on who purchased from the cartel. 
3. Companies appealed, but Court of First Instance confirmed the basic decision, although annulling minor parts of the decision. 
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TABLE 7 
RECENT INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: 
REPORTED MARKET CONCENTRATION AND PRICE INCREASES 
 
 
Industry Measure of Market Concentrationa Measure of Price Increase
b 
Aluminum Phosphide U.S.: C4 = 90 48%  
Bromine Products World: C3 = 76 NA 
Carbonless Paper Europe:  Cartel share = 85-90 NA 
Cartonboard Europe:  Cartel share = 80 20-26%  
Cement Europe: C6 = 50 NA 
Citric Acid World: C4 = 60 
W. Europe: C4= 85 
Estimated 21-24% markup over marginal cost 
Reported price increase of 30% in the U.S. and 
50% in Europe 
Ferrosilicon  U.S.: C4 = 100 NA 
Ferry Operators 
(Cross-Channel Freight)
C2 = 72 for cross-channel 
passenger market; same two 
firms were indicted in the cross-
channel freight cartel 
10%  
Fine Arts  C2 = 95 0 – 20% 
Graphite Electrodes U.S.: C4 = 93 
Canada: C2 = 90 
U.S.:  50% - 60%  
Canada:  90%  
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Industry Measure of Market Concentrationa Measure of Price Increase
b 
Isostatic Graphite World:  6 major firms NA  
Laminated Plastic Tubes U.S.: C3 = 95 NA 
Lysine World: C3 = 95 in late 1980’s 
(ADM began production in 1991 
and by 1996 had 47% world 
market share) 
Mexico: C2 = 90 
Reported price increases of 41% (“world”), 50% 
(Canada), and 70% in the first six months, 
doubling over the life of the conspiracy (U.S.) 
Maltol World: C2 = 80-90 NA 
Plastic Dinnerware U.S.: C2 > 90 NA 
Shipping (Central West 
African) 
Shipping conference held more 
than 90% market share 
NA 
Shipping (Far East) Shipping conference held 80% 
share between northern Europe 
and the Far East 
NA 
Shipping (French-
African) 
C4 = 90 34-39% 
Shipping (North 
Atlantic) 
1994: Cartel members had joint 
market share over 60% 
1995: Shipping conference held 
between 70-80% of the trans 
North-Atlantic container market
Damages Estimate, 1995:  Announced price 
increases in 1995 “would have meant an 
additional cost to shippers of US$65 to $75 
million, when compared with 1994 prices” 
Damages Estimate, 1994-98: Trans-Atlantic 
Conference Agreement (TACA) cost European 
industry $1.8 billion in extra shipping costs 
between 1994 and 1998 
Sodium Erythorbate U.S.: C2 = 90 NA 
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Industry Measure of Market Concentrationa Measure of Price Increase
b 
Sodium Gluconate Cartel members were world’s 
major producers 
NA 
Sorbates World: C2 = 71 14% 
Stainless Steel World: C4 = 52 100% 
Steel Beam Europe:  C10 = 66 NA 
Steel Heating Pipe (Pre-
Insulated Pipe) 
Western Europe:  C4 = 80 15-20% over one year 
Steel Tube, Seamless Europe cartel share = 19 NA 
Sugar Great Britain: C2 = 90 NA 
Tampico Fiber Cartel members had 
“overwhelming” share of the 
U.S. market 
NA 
Thermal Fax Paper U.S.: C3 = 40-45 10% 
Vitamins World: C3 = 75 for bulk vitamins U.S.: 20% 
Canada: 30% 
Zinc Phosphate Europe cartel share = 90 NA 
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Notes to Table 7: 
 
a All concentration figures are approximate.  Wherever possible concentration measures date to the period of the cartel.  In other 
instances the figures date to the period immediately prior to or after the cartel.  Detailed references are available from the authors. 
 
b All price increase measures are approximate and come from the trade press and press releases, official decisions, and speeches made 
by competition policy authorities.  Information is extremely sparse.  The price increase information usually refers to a selected period 
within the cartel years; it is not normally an indicator of the average price increase over the entire life of the cartel.  Detailed 
references are available from the authors.   
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TABLE 8 
IMPORTANCE OF CARTELIZED GOODS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY IMPORTS, 19971 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Aluminum Phosphide2 0.0078% 0.0048% 0.0074% 0.0067% 0.0065% 
Beer3 0.0091% 0.0147% 0.0072% 0.0098% 0.0182% 
Bromine4 0.0166% 0.0284% 0.0346% 0.0298% 0.0300% 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 0.0796% 0.0738% 0.0495% 0.0618% 0.0398% 
Carbon Cathode Block6 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.0000% 
Carbonless Paper7 0.0158% 0.0248% 0.0234% 0.0226% 0.0210% 
Cartonboard8 0.0200% 0.0345% 0.0502% 0.0405% 0.0250% 
Cement9 0.0559% 0.0258% 0.0249% 0.0302% 0.0134% 
Citric Acid10 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 0.0122% 0.0073% 0.0226% 0.0162% 0.0230% 
Fine Arts13 0.0028% 0.0050% 0.0078% 0.0061% 0.0342% 
Graphite Electrodes14 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.0000% 
Isostatic Graphite15 0.1484% 0.2265% 0.2252% 0.2132% 0.1401% 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 0.3689% 1.1664% 0.6906% 0.7852% 0.4774% 
Lysine17 0.1113% 0.0932% 0.1230% 0.1119% 0.1102% 
Maltol18 0.0623% 0.0778% 0.1112% 0.0930% 0.0900% 
Marine Construction19 0.2191% 0.0919% 0.3372% 0.2426% 0.0762% 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Plastic Dinnerware23 0.0544% 0.1461% 0.2115% 0.1660% 0.1377% 
Sodium Erythorbate24 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Sodium Gluconate25 0.0623% 0.0778% 0.1112% 0.0930% 0.0900% 
Sorbates26 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Stainless Steel27 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Steel Beam28 0.2605% 0.6074% 0.3308% 0.4046% 0.2011% 
Steel Heating Pipe29 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 0.0262% 0.0416% 0.0343% 0.0353% 0.0225% 
Sugar31 0.1265% 0.0718% 0.0138% 0.0498% 0.0109% 
Tampico Fiber32 0.0006% 0.0025% 0.0014% 0.0016% 0.0014% 
Thermal Fax Paper33 0.0611% 0.1294% 0.0761% 0.0901% 0.0783% 
Vitamins34 0.0100% 0.0212% 0.0149% 0.0161% 0.0130% 
Wastewater Construction35 0.0561% 0.1051% 0.0916% 0.0900% 0.0467% 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 12.96% 12.60% 11.77% 12.19% 8.97% 
Notes to Tables 8, 9, and 10 are given at the end of Table 10. 
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TABLE 9 
CARTELIZED GOODS AS A SHARE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY GDP, 19971 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP 
Aluminum Phosphide2 0.0078% 0.0048% 0.0074% 0.0067% 0.0065% 
Beer3 0.0091% 0.0147% 0.0072% 0.0098% 0.0182% 
Bromine4 0.0166% 0.0284% 0.0346% 0.0298% 0.0300% 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 0.0796% 0.0738% 0.0495% 0.0618% 0.0398% 
Carbon Cathode Block6 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.0000% 
Carbonless Paper7 0.0158% 0.0248% 0.0234% 0.0226% 0.0210% 
Cartonboard8 0.0200% 0.0345% 0.0502% 0.0405% 0.0250% 
Cement9 0.0559% 0.0258% 0.0249% 0.0302% 0.0134% 
Citric Acid10 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 0.0122% 0.0073% 0.0226% 0.0162% 0.0230% 
Fine Arts13 0.0028% 0.0050% 0.0078% 0.0061% 0.0342% 
Graphite Electrodes14 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.0000% 
Isostatic Graphite15 0.1484% 0.2265% 0.2252% 0.2132% 0.1401% 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 0.3689% 1.1664% 0.6906% 0.7852% 0.4774% 
Lysine17 0.1113% 0.0932% 0.1230% 0.1119% 0.1102% 
Maltol18 0.0623% 0.0778% 0.1112% 0.0930% 0.0900% 
Marine Construction19 0.2191% 0.0919% 0.3372% 0.2426% 0.0762% 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Plastic Dinnerware23 0.0544% 0.1461% 0.2115% 0.1660% 0.1377% 
Sodium Erythorbate24 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Sodium Gluconate25 0.0623% 0.0778% 0.1112% 0.0930% 0.0900% 
Sorbates26 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Stainless Steel27 0.1183% 0.1085% 0.0778% 0.0938% 0.0528% 
Steel Beam28 0.2605% 0.6074% 0.3308% 0.4046% 0.2011% 
Steel Heating Pipe29 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 0.0262% 0.0416% 0.0343% 0.0353% 0.0225% 
Sugar31 0.1265% 0.0718% 0.0138% 0.0498% 0.0109% 
Tampico Fiber32 0.0006% 0.0025% 0.0014% 0.0016% 0.0014% 
Thermal Fax Paper33 0.0611% 0.1294% 0.0761% 0.0901% 0.0783% 
Vitamins34 0.0100% 0.0212% 0.0149% 0.0161% 0.0130% 
Wastewater Construction35 0.0561% 0.1051% 0.0916% 0.0900% 0.0467% 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 1.97% 3.32% 2.71% 2.78% 1.69% 
Notes to Tables 8, 9, and 10 are given at the end of Table 10. 
 
 63
 
TABLE 10 
TOTAL VALUE OF CARTEL-AFFECTED IMPORTS, 19971 
 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Aluminum Phosphide2 70,402 82,664 220,860 373,926 1,452,864 
Beer3 82,321 254,612 214,361 551,294 4,053,841 
Bromine4 150,148 491,907 1,031,786 1,673,841 6,673,615 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 721,145 1,276,068 1,473,143 3,470,356 8,868,036 
Carbon Cathode Block6 621,595 3,859,815 7,659,252 12,140,662 30,557,546 
Carbonless Paper7 142,813 428,327 696,821 1,267,961 4,682,645 
Cartonboard8 181,251 595,795 1,495,838 2,272,884 5,576,247 
Cement9 506,339 445,984 741,979 1,694,302 2,984,991 
Citric Acid10 1,071,650 1,876,182 2,316,093 5,263,925 11,771,185 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 110,896 126,282 672,946 910,124 5,130,078 
Fine Arts13 25,785 86,150 231,267 343,202 7,619,113 
Graphite Electrodes14 621,595 3,859,815 7,659,252 12,140,662 30,557,546 
Isostatic Graphite15 1,344,868 3,916,392 6,707,800 11,969,060 31,215,217 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 3,342,778 20,171,006 20,567,075 44,080,859 106,364,314 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Lysine17 1,008,248 1,610,870 3,664,349 6,283,467 24,560,999 
Maltol18 564,916 1,345,035 3,312,196 5,222,147 20,060,451 
Marine Construction19 1,984,798 1,588,461 10,043,702 13,616,961 16,978,097 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 1,071,650 1,876,182 2,316,093 5,263,925 11,771,185 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 1,071,650 1,876,182 2,316,093 5,263,925 11,771,185 
Plastic Dinnerware23 493,255 2,525,856 6,297,960 9,317,071 30,679,451 
Sodium Erythorbate24 592,196 1,361,422 1,746,713 3,700,331 5,090,477 
Sodium Gluconate25 564,916 1,345,035 3,312,196 5,222,147 20,060,451 
Sorbates26 1,071,650 1,876,182 2,316,093 5,263,925 11,771,185 
Stainless Steel27 1,071,650 1,876,182 2,316,093 5,263,925 11,771,185 
Steel Beam28 2,360,020 10,504,156 9,850,996 22,715,172 44,795,212 
Steel Heating Pipe29 592,196 1,361,422 1,746,713 3,700,331 5,090,477 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 236,976 719,383 1,022,477 1,978,836 5,016,869 
Sugar31 1,146,447 1,240,914 410,048 2,797,409 2,424,484 
Tampico Fiber32 5,398 43,522 41,528 90,448 307,459 
Thermal Fax Paper33 553,335 2,237,895 2,265,394 5,056,624 17,437,672 
Vitamins34 90,985 367,034 444,804 902,823 2,887,216 
Wastewater Construction35 508,359 1,816,820 2,727,370 5,052,549 10,406,321 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of imports 
($000) 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 17,873,052 57,379,791 80,608,690 155,861,533 377,322,781 
 
Notes to Tables 8, 9, and 10: 
1 These tables use a combination of 3-digit and 4-digit SITC category matches.  The 3-digit codes were used only when 4-digit data 
were unavailable.  The list of developing countries is taken from World Development Report 2000/2001:  Attacking Poverty (World 
Bank), pp. 334-35.  As stated on p. 335 “Low income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing 
countries.”   
2 Inorganic chemical products, n.e.s 
3 Beer made from malt (including ale, stout and porter) 
4 Phenols and phenyl alcohols and their halogenated derivatives; ethers, alcohol peroxides, ether peroxides, epoxides etc; halogenated 
derivatives of hydrocarbons 
5 Structures and parts of structures: iron, steel, aluminum 
6 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s. 
7 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape, n.e.s. 
8 Boxes, bags & other packing containers, of paper or paperboard 
9 Portland cement, cement fondu, slag cement, etc. 
10 Carboxylic acids, and their anhydrides, halides, etc. 
11 Explosives and pyrotechnic products 
12 Ferro-alloys 
13 Art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
14 Other electrical machinery and equipment 
15 Organic chemical products, n.e.s.; chemical products and preparations, n.e.s. 
16 Miscellaneous articles of materials of division 58; polymerization and copolymerization products; condensation, polycondensation 
and polyaddition products 
17 Nitrogen-function compounds 
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18 Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds 
19 Ships, boats and floating structures 
20 Carboxylic acids, and their anhydrides, halides, etc. 
21 Other inorganic chemicals 
22 Carboxylic acids, and their anhydrides, halides, etc. 
23 Miscellaneous articles of materials of division 58 
24 Organo-inorganic and heterocyclic compounds 
25 Carboxylic acids, and their anhydrides, halides, etc. 
26 Carboxylic acids, and their anhydrides, halides, etc. 
27 Universals, plates and sheets of iron or steel; ingots and other primary forms of iron or steel 
28 Angles, shapes & sections & sheet piling of iron or steel; structures & parts of structures, iron or steel; plates 
29 Seamless tubes and pipes; blanks for tubes & pipes 
30 Seamless tubes and pipes; blanks for tubes & pipes 
31 Refined sugars and other products of refined beet or cane 
32 Vegetable textile fibers and waste of such fibers 
33 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape,  n.e.s.; paper and paperboard, in rolls or sheets, n.e.s. 
34 Provitamins and vitamins, natural or produced by synthesis 
35 Pumps and compressors, fans & blowers, centrifuges 
36 Other inorganic chemicals 
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TABLE 11 
IMPORTANCE OF CARTELIZED GOODS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRY IMPORTS (4-DIGIT SITC), 19971 
 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Aluminum Phosphide2 0.051% 0.018% 0.032% 0.029% 0.035% 
Beer3 0.060% 0.056% 0.031% 0.043% 0.096% 
Bromine4 0.109% 0.108% 0.151% 0.131% 0.159% 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 NA NA NA NA NA 
Carbon Cathode Block6 0.451% 0.848% 1.118% 0.950% 0.727% 
Carbonless Paper7 0.104% 0.094% 0.102% 0.099% 0.111% 
Cartonboard8 0.131% 0.131% 0.218% 0.178% 0.133% 
Cement9 0.367% 0.098% 0.108% 0.133% 0.071% 
Citric Acid10 NA NA NA NA NA 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 0.080% 0.028% 0.098% 0.071% 0.122% 
Fine Arts13 0.019% 0.019% 0.034% 0.027% 0.181% 
Graphite Electrodes14 0.451% 0.848% 1.118% 0.950% 0.727% 
Isostatic Graphite15 0.975% 0.860% 0.979% 0.936% 0.742% 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 0.358% 0.555% 0.920% 0.729% 0.730% 
Lysine17 NA NA NA NA NA 
Maltol18 NA NA NA NA NA 
Marine Construction19 NA NA NA NA NA 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Percent of total 
imports 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 NA NA NA NA NA 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 NA NA NA NA NA 
Plastic Dinnerware23 0.358% 0.555% 0.920% 0.729% 0.730% 
Sodium Erythorbate24 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sodium Gluconate25 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sorbates26 NA NA NA NA NA 
Stainless Steel27 NA NA NA NA NA 
Steel Beam28 0.172% 0.158% 0.149% 0.155% 0.119% 
Steel Heating Pipe29 0.429% 0.299% 0.255% 0.289% 0.121% 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 0.429% 0.299% 0.255% 0.289% 0.121% 
Sugar31 0.831% 0.272% 0.060% 0.219% 0.058% 
Tampico Fiber32 NA NA NA NA NA 
Thermal Fax Paper33 0.401% 0.491% 0.331% 0.396% 0.415% 
Vitamins34 0.066% 0.081% 0.065% 0.071% 0.069% 
Wastewater Construction35 NA NA NA NA NA 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 4.961% 4.670% 5.571% 5.184% 4.618% 
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TABLE 12 
CARTELIZED GOODS AS A SHARE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY GDP (4-DIGIT SITC), 19971 
 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP 
Aluminum Phosphide2 0.0078% 0.0048% 0.0074% 0.0067% 0.0065% 
Beer3 0.0091% 0.0147% 0.0072% 0.0098% 0.0182% 
Bromine4 0.0166% 0.0284% 0.0346% 0.0298% 0.0300% 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 NA NA NA NA NA 
Carbon Cathode Block6 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.1372% 
Carbonless Paper7 0.0158% 0.0248% 0.0234% 0.0226% 0.0210% 
Cartonboard8 0.0200% 0.0345% 0.0502% 0.0405% 0.0250% 
Cement9 0.0559% 0.0258% 0.0249% 0.0302% 0.0134% 
Citric Acid10 NA NA NA NA NA 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 0.0122% 0.0073% 0.0226% 0.0162% 0.0230% 
Fine Arts13 0.0028% 0.0050% 0.0078% 0.0061% 0.0342% 
Graphite Electrodes14 0.0686% 0.2232% 0.2572% 0.2163% 0.1372% 
Isostatic Graphite15 0.1484% 0.2265% 0.2252% 0.2132% 0.1401% 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 0.0544% 0.1461% 0.2115% 0.1660% 0.1377% 
Lysine17 NA NA NA NA NA 
Maltol18 NA NA NA NA NA 
Marine Construction19 NA NA NA NA NA 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP Percent of GDP 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 NA NA NA NA NA 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 NA NA NA NA NA 
Plastic Dinnerware23 0.0544% 0.1461% 0.2115% 0.1660% 0.1377% 
Sodium Erythorbate24 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sodium Gluconate25 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sorbates26 NA NA NA NA NA 
Stainless Steel27 NA NA NA NA NA 
Steel Beam28 0.0262% 0.0416% 0.0343% 0.0353% 0.0225% 
Steel Heating Pipe29 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 0.0654% 0.0787% 0.0586% 0.0659% 0.0228% 
Sugar31 0.1265% 0.0718% 0.0138% 0.0498% 0.0109% 
Tampico Fiber32 NA NA NA NA NA 
Thermal Fax Paper33 0.0611% 0.1294% 0.0761% 0.0901% 0.0783% 
Vitamins34 0.0100% 0.0212% 0.0149% 0.0161% 0.0130% 
Wastewater Construction35 NA NA NA NA NA 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 0.7552% 1.2298% 1.2812% 1.1805% 0.8715% 
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TABLE 13 
TOTAL VALUE OF CARTEL-AFFECTED IMPORTS (4-DIGIT SITC), 19971 
 
 
 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Aluminum Phosphide2 70,402 82,664 220,860 373,926 1,452,864 
Beer3 82,321 254,612 214,361 551,294 4,053,841 
Bromine4 150,148 491,907 1,031,786 1,673,841 6,673,615 
Cable-Stayed Bridges5 NA NA NA NA NA 
Carbon Cathode Block6 621,595 3,859,815 7,659,252 12,140,662 30,557,546 
Carbonless Paper7 142,813 428,327 696,821 1,267,961 4,682,645 
Cartonboard8 181,251 595,795 1,495,838 2,272,884 5,576,247 
Cement9 506,339 445,984 741,979 1,694,302 2,984,991 
Citric Acid10 NA NA NA NA NA 
Explosives11 NA NA NA NA NA 
Ferrosilicon12 110,896 126,282 672,946 910,124 5,130,078 
Fine Arts13 25,785 86,150 231,267 343,202 7,619,113 
Graphite Electrodes14 621,595 3,859,815 7,659,252 12,140,662 30,557,546 
Isostatic Graphite15 1,344,868 3,916,392 6,707,800 11,969,060 31,215,217 
Laminated Plastic Tubes16 493,255 2,525,856 6,297,960 9,317,071 30,679,451 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Lysine17 NA NA NA NA NA 
Maltol18 NA NA NA NA NA 
Marine Construction19 NA NA NA NA NA 
Monochloroacetic Acid20 NA NA NA NA NA 
Nucleotides21 NA NA NA NA NA 
Organic Peroxides22 NA NA NA NA NA 
Plastic Dinnerware23 493,255 2,525,856 6,297,960 9,317,071 30,679,451 
Sodium Erythorbate24 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sodium Gluconate25 NA NA NA NA NA 
Sorbates26 NA NA NA NA NA 
Stainless Steel27 NA NA NA NA NA 
Steel Beam28 236,976 719,383 1,022,477 1,978,836 5,016,869 
Steel Heating Pipe29 592,196 1,361,422 1,746,713 3,700,331 5,090,477 
Steel Tube, Seamless30 592,196 1,361,422 1,746,713 3,700,331 5,090,477 
Sugar31 1,146,447 1,240,914 410,048 2,797,409 2,424,484 
Tampico Fiber32 NA NA NA NA NA 
Thermal Fax Paper33 553,335 2,237,895 2,265,394 5,056,624 17,437,672 
Vitamins34 90,985 367,034 444,804 902,823 2,887,216 
Wastewater Construction35 NA NA NA NA NA 
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 Low Income 
Countries 
Lower Middle Income 
Countries 
Upper Middle 
Income Countries 
All Developing 
Countries 
High Income 
Countries 
Product Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Total Imports by 
Developing 
Countries 
($000) 
Value of total 
imports 
($000) 
Zinc Phosphate36 NA NA NA NA NA 
Total 6,168,361 18,144,637 30,364,468 54,677,466 157,906,079 
 
Notes to Tables 11, 12, and 13: 
1 The list of developing countries is taken from World Development Report 2000/2001:  Attacking Poverty (World Bank), pp. 334-35.  
As stated on p. 335 “Low income and middle-income economies are sometimes referred to as developing countries.” 
2 Inorganic chemical products, n.e.s 
3 Beer made from malt (including ale, stout and porter) 
4 Phenols and phenyl alcohols and their halogenated derivatives; ethers, alcohol peroxides, ether peroxides, epoxides etc; halogenated 
derivatives of hydrocarbons 
5 Structures & parts of structures: iron/steel plates; structures and parts of structures: aluminum plates and rods 
6 Other electrical machinery and equipment  
7 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape, n.e.s. 
8 Boxes, bags & other packing containers, of paper or paperboard 
9 Portland cement, cement fondu, slag cement, etc. 
10 Carboxylic acids with alcohol, phenol, etc. function 
11 Explosives and pyrotechnic products 
12 Ferro-alloys 
13 Art, collectors’ pieces and antiques 
14 Other electrical machinery and equipment 
15 Organic chemical products, n.e.s.; chemical products and preparations, n.e.s. 
16 Miscellaneous articles of materials of division.58; acrylic polymers, methacrylic polymers, etc.; aminoplasts 
17 Single or complex oxygen-function amino-compounds 
18 Heterocyclic compounds; nucleic acids 
19 Tugs, special purpose vessels, floating structures 
20 Monocarboxylic acids and their anhydrides, halides 
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21 Metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids 
22 Monocarboxylic acids & their anhydrides, halides; polycarboxylic acids and their anhydrides, etc.; carboxylic acids with alcohol, 
phenol, etc. function 
23 Miscellaneous articles of materials of division 58 
24 Heterocyclic compounds; nucleic acids 
25 Carboxylic acids with alcohol, phenol, etc. function 
26 Monocarboxylic acids and their anhydrides, halides 
27 Sheets and plates, rolled > 4.75mm of iron/steel; sheets and plates, rolled; thickness of less than 3mm; sheets and plates, rolled 
thickness 3mm to 4.75 mm iron or steel;  iron or steel coils for re-rolling 
28 Angles, shapes & sections & sheet piling of iron or steel; structures & parts of structures, iron or steel; plates 
29 Seamless tubes and pipes; blanks for tubes & pipes 
30 Seamless tubes and pipes; blanks for tubes & pipes 
31 Refined sugars and other products of refined beet or cane 
32 Sisal and other fibers of agave family, raw or processed 
33 Paper and paperboard, cut to size or shape,  n.e.s.; paper and paperboard, in rolls or sheets, n.e.s. 
34 Provitamins and vitamins, natural or produced by synthesis 
35 Filtering and purifying machinery for liquids and gases 
36 Metallic salts and peroxysalts of inorganic acids 
 
 
 
 
 
 75
FIGURE 1 
Citric Acid  Prices, 1990 - 1999
(Cartel: 1991 - 1995)
Comparison: CM R v  PM  Spot Avg Price
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FIGURE 2 
Graphite Electrode Prices, 1980 - 2000
(Cartel: July 1992 - June 1997)
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Sources:  DOJ Sentencing Memorandum of October 19, 1999, and a variety of other sources, including Forbes, Oil and Gas Journal, Dow Jones 
Commodity Service, UCAR earnings reports, and C/G SEC filings.   
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FIGURE 3 
 
OCTG Prices 
(Cartel:  1990-95) 
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FIGURE 4 
Cartel Share of Steel Tube Exports
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Source:  Robert Feenstra’s World Trade Flows, 1980-1997, With Production And Tariff Data (1999). 
 
